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Economic Development via Dam Building:  
The Role of the State Government in the Sarawak  
Corridor of Renewable Energy and the Impact  
on Environment and Local Communities
Andrew Aeria*
Since 1970, as a consequence of Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP) and its 
integration into the global economy, the development achievements and per capita 
GDP growth of the resource-rich state of Sarawak have been impressive—although 
not without problems.  Since timber and petroleum resources are exhaustible, and 
there is a concern with finding new sources of growth and revenue, the federal and 
state governments advocated industrial diversification in 2008 via the development 
of a multibillion-ringgit regional development corridor called the Sarawak Corridor 
of Renewable Energy (SCORE).  Central to the success of the huge developmental 
corridor was cheap hydroelectric power (HEP).  For the Sarawak government, 
SCORE’s launch and eventual success were based on the availability of abundant 
water resources and suitable hydropower dam sites in the state.  Yet, SCORE is 
likely to contribute to further environmental degradation and impact negatively upon 
the livelihoods and welfare of local communities.  This paper examines this recent 
development trend and its consequences.  Specifically, it examines the role of the 
Sarawak state government in advocating the construction of numerous HEP dams, 
the role of foreign and local investment in SCORE, and their collective impact upon 
the environment and local communities.  What this paper reveals is the nexus of 
close relationships that binds key politicians in the state administration with crony 
businesses associated with foreign-linked contracts that has proven to be destruc-
tive socially and environmentally.
Keywords: hydropower dam, foreign investment, state patronage, NEP, 
SCORE, Sarawak, Malaysia
I Introduction
In late October 2007 Abdul Aziz Husain, a former state secretary of Sarawak, brother-
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in-law of then Chief Minister Abdul Taib Mahmud, and the newly appointed group man-
aging director of Sarawak Energy Berhad (SEB),1) gave a PowerPoint presentation titled 
“Chinese Power Plants in Malaysia—Present & Future Development” at the China—
ASEAN Power Corporation & Development Forum in Nanning, China.
His slide presentation, which was temporarily uploaded onto the Internet,2) outlined 
the Sarawak state government’s plans to transform the state from a rural backwater into 
the industrial powerhouse of Borneo via the construction of numerous hydroelectric 
mega-dams to supply power to the recently announced massive industrial corridor in the 
state.  Called the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE), the corridor was 
conceived as part of a concerted attempt by the country’s policy planners in 2006 “to 
stimulate global and domestic investment in traditionally rural areas to create balanced 
development throughout the country” (RECODA 2015a) in a resource-rich part of the 
country.
Providing the clean and green renewable energy to power the numerous expected 
local and foreign large-scale industrial investments in SCORE was the proposal (revealed 
by Abdul Aziz Husain) to construct 52 hydroelectric power (HEP) mega-dams.  This was 
to be achieved with the assistance of Chinese companies and their dam-building technol-
ogy, which would provide a total power capacity of 20,000 MW and an electricity potential 
generating capacity of 82,000 GWh/year (Abdul Aziz Husain 2007).  Of these dams, 13 
were scheduled to be built by 2020 and would have an installed capacity of 7,165 MW of 
electricity.  Collectively, these 13 major dams would flood a total land area of 2,300 km2 
and displace 30,000–50,000 indigenous people from over 235 settlements (BMF 2013a; 
2013b) (see map in Appendix).
Since then, indigenous community organizations along with local and international 
environmental groups have been struggling to stop the construction of these proposed 
hydroelectric mega-dams designed to power Sarawak well into the twenty-first century 
1) Sarawak Energy Berhad is the sole supplier of electric power in the state of Sarawak.  It is a wholly 
owned company of the Sarawak state government, which holds sole monopoly interests in power 
generation, transmission, electricity distribution, and marketing within the state.  Its directors are 
both civil servants and former civil servants along with politicians and businessmen with close links 
to the former chief minister and current governor Abdul Taib Mahmud.  Its key subsidiary is the 
Syarikat SESCO Berhad, formerly the government-owned Sarawak Electricity Supply Corporation, 
which was privatized in 2005 (Sarawak Energy 2013).  Its senior staff and directors have been 
accused of being involved in major corrupt business deals involving million-ringgit contracts handed 
to companies owned either by themselves or by interests close to Abdul Taib Mahmud (Sarawak 
Report, April 10, 2012; August 25, 2013; BMF 2013c).
2) The lecture slides were hastily removed from the official SEB Web site after environmental groups 
discovered and downloaded it.  In other words, the plan was likely to have remained secret but was 
inadvertently uploaded.  Nonetheless, it remains accessible here: http://assets.survivalinternational.
org/static/files/mediabox/Sarawak_Energy_Confidential.pdf.
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(The Star, July 23, 2008; Mongabay 2009; The Borneo Project n.d., Stop the Dams).  No 
broad public consultations have been held to discuss whether such a large-scale industrial 
development program is desirable, let alone viable.  Neither have local indigenous peoples 
affected by this dam-building program been consulted, in outright violation of the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) mandating 
prior and informed consent when development impacts indigenous peoples (The Borneo 
Project n.d., NGO Coalition).
To date, detailed information about the Sarawak government’s official development 
plans involving so many HEP dams remains vague and under wraps except for what has 
been uploaded onto a Web site dedicated to the development of SCORE3) and regular 
official government press statements about its benefits (Sarawak Government 2014). 
Consequently, the various issues and impact of this development strategy remain largely 
unexamined.  Former Chief Minister and now Governor Abdul Taib Mahmud has long 
been Sarawak’s most ardent proponent of hydroelectric dams (The Star, April 11, 2009; 
April 12, 2009).  He remains convinced about their multiple benefits, which include 
reversing rural-urban population migration and transforming the basic infrastructure of 
the state’s interior regions (The Borneo Post, June 18, 2013).
Since 1970, as a consequence of the New Economic Policy (NEP)4) and as a result 
of being integrated into the global economy, Sarawak has displayed impressive develop-
ment achievements and per capita GDP growth—although not without problems.  Since 
Sarawak’s economy is precipitated on massive resource extraction and primary 
commodity- based industries, the economy has seen significant wealth creation but one 
based on a pattern of resource exhaustion and environmental degradation with significant 
affiliated impacts upon local communities (Hong 1987; Colchester 1989; WRM and SAM 
1989; Bevis 1995; Cleary and Eaton 1995; Majid-Cooke 1997; 1999; Kaur 1998a; IDEAL 
1999; Brown 2001; BMF 2012a; Bryan et al. 2013).
The sustainability of the current NEP-led development model—which is based on 
primary resource exhaustion, agricultural commodity plantation development, large-scale 
infrastructure, and regional industrial corridors—may just be undermined by its own 
success (Majid-Cooke 1997; Phoa 2003; BMF 2014).  Hence, instead of improving the 
quality of life for the majority, the commissioning of numerous hydroelectric dam projects 
3) Details about SCORE are available on the Web site of the Regional Corridor Development Author-
ity (RECODA) Sarawak: http://www.recoda.com.my/invest-in-score/what-is-score/.
4) In 1970, the federal government of Malaysia launched the NEP.  This was followed by the National 
Development Policy (NDP) from 1991 to 2000 and the National Vision Policy (NVP) from 2001 to 
2010.  The NEP specifically addressed issues of poverty and ethnic income inequality and had three 
key aims: to eradicate poverty, to restructure society to eliminate the identification of race with 
economic function, and to create a dynamic Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community.
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by the Sarawak state government in its single-minded pursuit of SCORE is likely to 
contribute to further environmental degradation and impact negatively upon the liveli-
hoods and welfare of local communities (BMF 2010; 2012a; Yale Environment Review 
2013; Sarawak Report, January 30, 2015).
This paper examines the recent development trend and its consequences.  Specifi-
cally, it examines the role of the Sarawak state government in advocating the construction 
of numerous HEP dams, the role of foreign and local investment in SCORE, and their 
collective impact upon the environment and local communities.  What this paper reveals 
is the nexus of close relationships that binds key politicians in the state administration 
with crony businesses associated with foreign-linked contracts, which has proven to be 
destructive socially and environmentally.
There is a whole body of literature on the political economy of development relating 
to state capture by corporate and political crony interests whereby politicians and agen-
cies of the state, which in theory serve the people, are captured by interests antithetical 
to those of the public.5)  These practices have been ongoing in Sarawak since inde-
pendence, particularly in the form of crony business contract awards such as timber 
concessions, land grants, and infrastructure contracts (Milne 1973; Leigh 1991; Mason 
1995; Brown 2001; Ross 2001; Aeria 2002; Mersat 2005; Straumann 2014).  This paper 
contributes further to these studies by examining the recent expansion of crony political 
business links into a foreign-invested venture.
II Sarawak’s Development Record as Background
The largest state in Malaysia, Sarawak holds rich resource deposits of petroleum, natu-
ral gas, coal, silica, and, until recently, timber and gold.  Much land, post-logging, has 
been made available for modern commercial plantation agriculture, mainly oil palm and 
acacia pulp plantations.6)  The state’s numerous large rivers are also potential generators 
of hydroelectric power to transform the state into a heavy industry powerhouse.
Wealth Inequalities in Economic Growth
Development achievement has been impressive since 1970.  Sarawak’s transformation 
5) Among some key early works are those on patron-clientelism (Lande 1964; Scott 1972), relative 
and embedded autonomy (Evans 1995), and rent-seeking (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974; Bhagwati 
1982; Tollison 1982).  For more recent work on Malaysia, see Gomez and Jomo (1997).
6) Research on the Sarawak economy is relatively sparse.  However, there are some works by Jackson 
(1968), Leigh (1979), Bugo (1984), Reece (1988), Abdul Majid Mat Salleh et al. (1990), ITTO (1990), 
Syawe (1990), Wee (1995), Ooi (1997), Kaur (1998a; 1998b), Majid-Cooke (1999), and Phoa (2003).
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into a fast-growing state is reflected in its recurrently positive growth rates (see Table 1). 
Its economic growth has consistently weathered economic recessions—in 1985–86, 1998–
2000, and 2008–09.7)  However, Sarawak’s economic growth is also volatile.  Annual GDP 
swings are large, with differences ranging as much as eight percentage points either way.
Consequently, Sarawak has, on aggregate, seen a general rise in life expectancy and 
standards of living and significant improvements in transport and communication infra-
structure.  Education and health-care systems have improved and provide for the welfare 
of more people than ever before (Government of Malaysia 1989; 1993).  Similarly, more 
Sarawakians own houses, cars, motorcycles, and other household amenities (Department 
of Statistics, Malaysia 1995).  Clearly, poverty has been reduced in Sarawak, as shown 
in Table 2.8)
Even as overall poverty levels have fallen, Sarawak’s Gini coefficient has fluctuated. 
From a reading of 0.501 (1979), the Gini fell to a low of 0.407 (1999) before rising again 
7) In 1967 Sarawak’s GDP was RM768 million at constant 1978 prices.  By 2010, this figure had reached 
an estimated RM50,804 million.  GDP per capita (constant 1978 prices) in 1967 was RM915.  By 
2010, it was an estimated RM20,560 (Department of Statistics, Sarawak, various issues).  During 
the period of the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006–10), mean monthly gross household income also rose 
from RM2,725 (2004) to RM3,581 (2009) (Government of Malaysia 2010, 399).
8) Poverty is complicated, especially if one takes into consideration the ratio of regional poverty vis-
à-vis the national incidence, i.e., the poverty gap and rural-urban poverty figures.  And yet, despite 
large gains, these aggregated figures still put Sarawak among the five states with the highest 
poverty and hard-core poverty rates in Malaysia.  In 2009 the poverty rates of the other four states 
were: Sabah (19.2 percent), Perlis (6 percent), Kedah (5.3 percent), and Kelantan (4.8 percent). 
Hard-core poverty figures were: Sabah (4.7 percent), Perlis (0.8 percent), Kedah (0.8 percent), and 
Kelantan (1 percent) (Unit Perancang Ekonomi 2011).  UNDP estimated Sarawak’s poverty rate in 
2004 for a household of 4.6 persons to be 8.02 percent and individuals at 10.63 percent based on a 
poverty line income (PLI) measurement (Urban PLI: RM799/month; Rural PLI: RM778/month) 
(UNDP 2007, 63–64, 68).
Table 1 Sarawak: Average Annual GDP Growth Rates, 1970–2010
Year 1970 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
% 7.9a) 7.5 7.6 15.2 10.6 3.9 2.0 1.4 3.7b) 8.3 6.3
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
% 10.7 3.7 3.9 11.3 14.1 11.9 3.9 2.0 5.3 –0.6
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
% 0.3 4.5 7.6 6.9 5.0 4.3 6.5 0.3c) –2.0 4.3
Sources: Government of Malaysia (1971, 19; 2010, 370); Department of Statistics Malaysia, Sarawak (various 
issues); Shireen Mardziah Hashim (1998, 132), Malaysian Rating Corporation Berhad (2015, 4).
Notes: a) Estimated annual growth rate, 1965–70.
b) At 1987 constant prices (from 1988 onward).
c) Year on Year (from 2008 onward).
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to 0.442 (2004) and 0.448 (2009).  This means that income and wealth inequality in the 
state actually fell in the first 30 years of the NEP before rising again (UNDP 2007; Unit 
Perancang Ekonomi 2011).  It is the hard-core poor who are most affected.  Current data 
for this category shows a similar trend since 2007, when the percentage of hard-core 
poor, which had dropped to 0.7 percent from a high of 10 percent (1984), reversed and 
rose again to 1 percent in 2009 (Government of Malaysia 2008, 58; Unit Perancang 
 Ekonomi 2011).
Likewise, wealth inequalities are clearly evident in the government unit trust 
schemes (ASN/ASB)9) specifically set up for Bumiputera groups10) since 1980—in terms 
of both number of investors and total investments (2004: 694,000 investors/RM3.8623 
billion; 2012: 1.098 million investors/RM16.442 billion) (Government of Malaysia 2008, 
59; The Borneo Post, February 20, 2013).  By the end of 2012, each Sarawakian  Bumiputera 
9) The Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN) and the Amanah Saham Bumiputera (ASB) investment trust 
schemes are government initiatives to encourage Bumiputeras to invest in their medium- and long-
term future.  Through these initiatives, the government hopes to lift Bumiputeras out of poverty 
and help them achieve a higher standard of living.  Launched in April 1981, the ASN scheme is a 
variable-price investment product that seeks to “generate reasonable level of income distribution 
and capital appreciation to the unit holders through a diversified portfolio of investments” (ASNB 
2015).  On the other hand, the ASB, which was launched in January 1990, is a fixed-price investment 
product that seeks to “generate long-term, consistent and competitive returns to the unit holders 
whilst ensuring the preservation of capital at minimal risk tolerance level” (ibid.).  These investment 
schemes, along with numerous other similar schemes, are thus designed to help the government 
of Malaysia achieve the dual aims of the New Economic Policy (NEP): eradicating poverty and 
restructuring society.
10) The term “Bumiputera” refers to indigenous persons or people of Malay (Melayu) and native com-
munities of Malaysia.  For more information on the definition of Bumiputera, see Ooi (2004, 287).
Table 2 Sarawak Poverty Rates, 1975–2009 (percent of households below the official poverty line)
Year Total Urban Rural Hard-core Poverty
1975 56.5 22.8 64.4 –
1980 47.7 17.8 56.0 –
1985 31.3 8.8 39.3 10.0 (1984)
1987 24.7 7.5 29.0 4.4
1990 21.0 4.9 24.7 3.3 (1989)
1993 19.1 6.0 23.6 3.0 (1992)
1995 17.0 4.6 21.1 1.3
2004 7.5 – – 1.1
2007 4.2 – – 0.7
2009 5.3 – – 1.0
Sources: Shireen Mardziah Hashim (1998, 49–50); Government of Malaysia (1976, Table 9-1; 1984, 
Tables 3-4, 3-7; 1991, Table 1-8; 1993, Table 3-1; 2006, Box 16-2, Table C; 2008); Unit 
Perancang Ekonomi (2011).
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investor averaged RM15,000 in their ASN/ASB unit trust accounts (The Star, February 
20, 2013).  This growth augured well for poverty eradication since it suggested more 
people had disposable income, which they set aside for savings and investment as a result 
of the NEP’s implementation.11)
However, a closer examination indicates a more nuanced picture. The median of the 
7.824 million ASBN unit holders in Malaysia falls in the lowest category of “RM5,000 
and below” with a mean investment/saving of RM611 (see Table 3). Hence, although the 
mean investment/saving of the 1.098 million ASBN unit holders in Sarawak each was 
RM15,000 (The Star, February 20, 2013), there is likely relatively little difference in the 
median pattern of ASBN unit holders in the state, i.e. in the lowest “RM5,000 and below” 
category with a mean investment/saving of RM611.
While the ASN/ASB unit trust funds were set up to encourage savings and long-term 
investments among low-income Bumiputeras, the reality is that a majority of  Bumiputeras 
in the state do not earn sufficient incomes to give them the extra cash after monthly 
expenses to allocate funds to savings and long-term investments in unit trust schemes.
This would also explain why, in 2006, Sarawak was ranked 11th out of 14 in  Malaysia’s 
overall development composite index (Government of Malaysia 2006, 356)12) and why 
11) To gauge progress in eradicating poverty, the government has utilized a poverty line income meas-
urement that assumes the basic income level necessary to sustain a household within a minimum 
standard of living.  First published in the Mid-term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan, the poverty 
line income is based on a basket of goods comprising food as well as clothing, footwear, and other 
non-food items such as rent, fuel, power, transport and communications, health, education, and 
recreation for a household of about five persons.  In 1987 the poverty line income was defined as 
RM350 for a household of 5.14 persons in Peninsular Malaysia, RM533 for a household of 5.36 
persons in Sabah, and RM429 for a household of 5.24 persons in Sarawak (Government of Malaysia 
1989, 45).  In the 10th Malaysia Plan (2011–15) this poverty line income was revised to RM763 
(Peninsular Malaysia), RM1,048 (Sabah and Labuan), and RM912 (Sarawak) (Government of Malay-
sia 2010, 397).
12) More current figures are not available.
Table 3 Malaysia: Number of ASN/ASB Unit Trust Holders and Total Units Held, 2012
Breakdown of  
Unit Holdings
Number of Unit Holders  
(%)
Total Units  
in Circulation
Mean  
(RM)
5,000 and below 5,769,315 (73.73) 3,525,864,015 611
5,001–10,000 442,932 (5.66) 2,956,943,218 6,675
10,001–50,000 999,209 (12.77) 22,581,282,595 22,599
50,001–500,000 600,557 (7.67) 72,707,968,080 121,067
500,001 and above 12,138 (0.15) 8,525,132,256 692,087
Total 7,824,331 (100) 110,297,190,164 14,096
Source: Permodalan Nasional Berhad (2013).
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UNDP noted that poverty in Malaysia was mainly Bumiputera in ethnic character and 
had a rural and regional character, with “the indigenous communities in Sabah and 
 Sarawak” being “especially prominent” (UNDP 2007, iii).
There are further realities that call into question the overall sustainability of 
 Sarawak’s economic development model, an issue seldom addressed—let alone discussed 
in depth—by policy makers.
A recent social impact assessment of the hitherto nomadic Penan of the Ulu Belaga 
area affected by the current Murum dam project included the preparation of a “Resettle-
ment Action Plan” (RAP).  The RAP noted that their “average cash incomes (from wages 
and allowances) vary between RM49 and RM272 per household per month” (Chemsian 
Konsultant Sdn Bhd 2011; Sarawak Energy 2012).  Hence, although there has been much 
progress overall in reducing poverty and inequality under the NEP’s rapid economic 
growth since 1970, both remain entrenched in Sarawak.
Reliance on Primary Resource Extraction
Sarawak’s economic growth and pattern of industrialization over the last four decades 
has also produced a skewed pattern of “unequal development,” a pattern most clearly 
seen in the exploitation of Sarawak’s rich resource endowments (Aeria 2013).
Up until now, Sarawak’s economy has focused intensively upon the exploitation of 
its extensive petroleum, gas, and forest resources, mainly timber.  Petroleum is largely 
an offshore enclave industry controlled by the professionally run national oil corporation 
Petronas; and revenues and profits when derived are owned solely by the federal govern-
ment.  Hence, the Sarawak government has focused mainly on land-based “economic 
development,” a euphemism for tropical timber extraction and more recently the conver-
sion of logged forest lands into commercial oil palm and other cash crop plantations.13)
Weak governance and state capture by political-business elites have seen a growing 
prevalence of extensive corruption and financial leakages in the award of timber conces-
sions and infrastructure contracts, weak enforcement of state forest policy, and blatant 
land grabs of native customary rights lands under the pretext of “development.”14)
Consequently, the state has been depleted of its once-pristine rain forests.  Bereft 
of sustainable timber revenues, logged secondary rain forest has been clear-felled, mainly 
13) For more information about the transformation of Sarawak’s forestry into cash crop plantations, see 
World Bank (1991), Kaur (1998b), Majid-Cooke (1999), Phoa (2003), Jomo et al. (2004), and  SarVision 
(2011).  See also official agricultural land use data available on the Sarawak State Planning Unit Web 
site: www.spu.sarawak.gov.my.
14) The investigative Web sites of Sarawak Report (www.sarawakreport.org), Bruno Manser Fonds 
(www.bmf.ch/en/), and Global Witness (www.globalwitness.org) are the best Web sites that docu-
ment these practices in Sarawak.
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for commercial oil palm plantations.  A study by Bruno Manser Fonds (BMF) found that
only an estimated 5 per cent of primary forests have been spared from logging.  Sarawak’s large 
remaining secondary rainforests are currently being destroyed at a rate three times faster than in 
Asia overall, mainly for the planting of oil palms.  1,021,587 hectares out of Sarawak’s 12.4 million 
hectares (around one twelfth) were already covered with oil palm plantations in late 2011. (BMF 
2012a, 6)15)
Indeed, an official document leaked from the Sarawak Land and Survey Department 
to the whistle-blower Web site Sarawak Report details an extensive list of politically 
well-connected companies, a listing of the who’s who of the political and business elites 
within the state that have benefited from extremely cheap and even free grants of exten-
sive tracts of land for cash crop plantation farming (especially oil palm) (Sarawak Report, 
January 28, 2015).
Compounding this “unequal development” pattern is Sarawak’s economic path 
dependence given its over-reliance on primary resource extraction.  Sarawak’s relative 
share of sectoral GDP by industrial origin reflects this.  Its reliance on its primary com-
modity sector averaged around 35 percent in 1967, over 40 percent in the 1970s, and 
over 50 percent in the 1980s before reducing to 45 percent in 1995, 41 percent in 1997, 
47 percent in 2000, 36.3 percent in 2005, and 34.3 percent in 2009 (Department of 
 Statistics, Sarawak, various issues) (see also Table 4).
What is significant and important to note is that this over-reliance on primary 
resource extraction has meant that Sarawak’s forests have all but been decimated over 
the last four decades.  A recent study that utilized CLASlite satellite technology to mon-
itor tropical forest deforestation and degradation found that “nearly 80% of the land 
surface of Sabah and Sarawak was impacted by previously undocumented, high-impact 
logging or clearing operations from 1990 to 2009” (Bryan et al. 2013).16)
15) Critical scholars do not necessarily accept that the statistical figures of the Sarawak government 
relating to forest cover and oil palm plantations are reliable.  Sarawak forest policy sees forests 
classified into three main categories: permanent forest estates (PFE), totally protected areas, and 
stateland.  Managed by the Sarawak Forest Department (licensing and regulatory functions) and 
the Sarawak Forestry Corporation (operational functions), all the above lands are liable to be sub-
jected to either licensed economic activities or illegal logging.  Most logging and plantation activities 
occur on PFE and state land.  Nonetheless, despite all these lands being transformed by massive 
timber extraction and cash crop plantations, they remain officially classified as forests and are 
declared as such in official statistics.  This gives the impression to all who are unaware that Sarawak 
remains a state with a high forest cover.  For further information, see Liew (2007).
16) The study showed clearly, and on the basis of scientific data, that “[O]verall, only 8% and 3% of land 
area in Sabah and Sarawak, respectively, was covered by intact forests under designated protected 
areas” (Bryan et al. 2013).  In other words, this study concluded that “very few forest ecosystems 
remain intact in Sabah or Sarawak” (ibid.).
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Dams as Next Source of Economic Development
Since timber and petroleum resources are exhaustible and there is concern over finding 
new sources of growth and revenue, the federal and state governments advocated indus-
trial diversification in 2008 via the development of the multibillion-ringgit SCORE to 
ensure that the NEP’s objectives of redistribution with continued growth were not 
 jeopardized.  Central to the success of the huge developmental corridor was cheap hydro-
electric power.  For the Sarawak government, SCORE’s launch and eventual success 
were based on the availability of abundant water resources and suitable hydropower dam 
sites in the state.  The Sarawak Integrated Water Resources Management Master Plan 
concluded that “hydroelectric power generation [had] particularly highly potential and 
[was] suitable in Sarawak due to the abundance of water, with an annual precipitation of 
about 4000 mm” (SIWRM Master Plan 2008).  The huge financial resources required to 
build the initial 13 mega-dams with their spinoff contracts also meant that hydroelectric 
mega-dam construction and electricity power generation along with hundreds of kilome-
ters of power cable infrastructure would emerge as the state’s new source of economic 
growth over the next decade.
Table 4 Sarawak: Comparison of Share of GDP by Industrial Origin in Constant Prices, 1967–2009 (percent)a)
Industry 1967b) 1970c) 1975c) 1980d) 1985d) 1990d) 1995e) 2000e) 2005f) 2009f)
Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, etc.
34.6 37.0 27.2 27.6 21.9 24.1 16.0 14.9 17.4 15.7
Mining, quarrying 0.4 3.5 13.6 30.3 34.1 32.8 28.8 31.8 20.4 18.2
Manufacturing 8.9 9.4 10.2 7.6 11.7 12.8 19.2 22.0 28.1 26.7
Utilities 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.3 n.a. n.a.
Construction 4.4 5.3 5.1 4.7 4.9 3.3 8.4 2.7 2.1 2.2
Wholesale and retail trade 12.2 13.5 12.0 8.2 7.7 7.5 7.9 6.8 7.5 9.6
Transport, storage,  
communications
6.1 6.5 7.9 3.3 4.0 4.8 5.1 5.6 8.3 8.9
Ownership of dwellings, 
banking, financial services, 
real estate
5.9 7.7 7.2 4.1 4.0 4.6 5.2 5.1 7.1 8.7
Other services 21.0 10.5 10.1 4.6 1.5 0.3 (0.2) 1.5 3.5 3.6
Government services 5.7 5.2 5.2 8.5 8.6 8.4 7.8 6.5 5.5 6.0
Sources: Department of Statistics Malaysia, Sarawak (various issues); Government of Malaysia (1973, Table 
1-5; 1976, Tables 10-1, 10-3; 1981, Table 5-2; 1986, Tables 5-2, 5-3; 1991, Table 1-12; 1993, Table 
2-13; 1996, Table 5-2).
Notes: a) Some totals do not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.
b) 1967 prices
c) 1970 prices
d) 1978 prices
e) 1987 prices
f) 2000 prices
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III The Regional Corridor Development Authority and SCORE
The lead agency for the implementation of SCORE has not been any local government 
authority but the state government via a powerful statutory agency, the Regional Cor-
ridor Development Authority (RECODA).  This is due to the unique constitutional char-
acteristics of Sarawak within the federation of Malaysia.
The 1963 Malaysia Agreement along with the Federal Constitution accorded the 
state government of Sarawak (and Sabah) greater control over all its land-based resources 
and greater autonomy in overseeing economic development than the powers enjoyed by 
the state governments in Peninsular Malaysia.  Principally, this was enshrined in the 
transfer of federal powers to the state and concurrent lists of governmental powers, which 
included the unusual power of control over immigration into Sarawak territory, along 
with additional sources of revenue and special development grants (Lim 1997).17)  As well, 
enshrined in the State List of Powers of the Malaysian Constitution was control over 
local government and development within its borders.
Sarawak is presently divided into 26 local government administrative districts (also 
known as local councils) made up of city councils, municipal councils, district councils, 
and one special authority called the Bintulu Development Authority.  All these local 
councils fall under the strict financial and political jurisdiction of the state government’s 
Ministry of Local Government and Community Development.  Local government elec-
tions in Sarawak were suspended in 1971 and abolished in 1977, when the state assembly 
adopted the Local Authority Amendment and the Kuching Municipal Amendment Bills. 
Since then, all local councilors have been political appointees of the state government.
As a result, the only autonomy available to local councils is in the form of planning 
and management functions related to “conservancy, scavenging, street lighting, road 
maintenance and to a certain extent matters pertaining to environment and public health” 
(Sarok 2009, 22) within their areas of jurisdiction.  Although local councils collect local 
taxes, these funds are insufficient to cover all their annual expenses.  Hence, nearly all 
remain dependent on financial grants and transfers from the Sarawak state government.
Constitutionally, the Sarawak state government has always enjoyed considerable 
leeway in undertaking and managing its own development projects and activities, the 
most recent and important being SCORE.  To this end, the state government set up 
RECODA in 2009 as the sole agency “tasked with overseeing and managing SCORE” 
(RECODA 2015b).
17) These “special concessions” to Sarawak in 1963, relative to the other states in Peninsular Malaysia, 
were designed to win over the native groups of Sarawak who were initially hostile to the idea of the 
formation of Malaysia (Lim 1997).
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RECODA: Powerful Supra-Agency of the State Government of Sarawak
The setting up of RECODA was seen as necessary given the huge size of SCORE. 
According to official sources, SCORE covers “over 70,000 square kilometres of the 
resource rich central region” of Sarawak, and it “has a long coastline of more than 
1,000 km, over 8 million hectares of forests, almost 5 million hectares of arable land and 
peat land suitable for agriculture” (RECODA 2015c).18)  The corridor has 1.2 billion 
barrels of known oil reserves; over 80 million tonnes of silica sand; and over 22 million 
tonnes of kaolin or china clay, a key component of cosmetics, ceramics, and, most recently, 
combat area medical equipment (RECODA 2015a).  Citing Sarawak’s “abundance of 
natural resources, including clean and safe renewable resources, such as hydropower 
that offers commercial users clean energy at competitive rates” (ibid.), policy planners 
thus earmarked SCORE as the region for the establishment of energy-sector industries. 
Ten high-impact priority industries19) were identified and a two-decade-long development 
plan drawn up to realize the state’s industrialization blueprint.
SCORE’s geographic reach and its desire for large-scale investments have meant 
that economic and developmental activities within it often traverse numerous local coun-
cil jurisdictions.  Not only would managing major investors require deft coordination 
between various state government agencies, but it would also require organization and 
dexterity when dealing with the many local councils and their various planning and main-
tenance departments located within SCORE.  Hence, the state government established 
RECODA as an agency tasked with overseeing and managing SCORE in an effort to cut 
bureaucratic red tape and facilitate foreign and domestic investment.
Set up as a one-stop government agency to avoid “traditional government procedural 
delays” (RECODA 2015b), RECODA is a powerful agency chaired by the chief minister 
of Sarawak.  To ensure efficiency and efficacy, RECODA also has “board representation 
from all of the relevant federal and state agencies to ensure swift decision making” (ibid.).  It 
has two defined primary tasks.  First, RECODA “promotes SCORE by creating and stim-
ulating new and existing markets”; and second, it is tasked with attracting investments 
and industries to SCORE so as to “achieve the ambitious investment goals set by the state” 
(ibid.).  As noted on its Web site, “in the face of fierce global competition not just from 
traditional or regional competitors, but also from developed countries, RECODA under-
stands the need for an environment that generates confidence for private and corporate 
investors” (ibid.).  In other words, RECODA was set up to be a “lean and nimble orga n-
18) A map showing the geographic spread of SCORE is available at http://www.recoda.com.my/invest-
in-score/score-areas/.
19) These industries are: aluminum, glass, steel, oil-based, palm oil, fishing and aquaculture, livestock, 
timber, marine, and tourism (RECODA 2015d).
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isation capable of rapid decision-making, fast track approvals and implementation of stra-
tegic and tactical initiatives to ensure investors are able to hit the ground running” (ibid.).
And yet, precisely because the RECODA board is chaired by the chief minister, the 
agency is effectively a powerful supra-agency of the state government of Sarawak,20) one 
that transcends all local government authorities within its geographic sphere of activity. 
Hence, for all purposes, when we discuss SCORE and the developmental impact of the 
foreign investments and industries in the corridor, our discussion is focused on the role 
of the state government and not on local government or local councils, since the latter’s 
role is minimal.  Although local government authorities do operate within the geograph-
ical area of SCORE, they essentially act only as providers of public services within their 
areas of urban and rural jurisdiction,21) with little responsibility over investments, devel-
opment, and industries related to SCORE.
IV The Hydroelectric Mega-Dams and Their Collective Impact  
on Environment and Local Communities
Early in the second decade of this century, SCORE’s industrialization program was val-
ued at US$105 billion and was aimed at transforming and developing the state by the year 
2030 (Sovacool and Bulan 2011).  The underlying assumption is that accelerated economic 
growth and development will, ipso facto, improve the quality of life for the people of 
Sarawak (RECODA 2012).
Indeed, SCORE has been touted as “the most capital intensive and ambitious energy 
project ever undertaken in Southeast Asia” (Sovacool and Bulan 2011) with the “firm 
belief that a massively increased energy supply will entail economic growth and develop-
ment” (BMF 2012a).
In pursuit of this goal, the 52 HEP dams—including the completed Batang Ai dam, 
as announced by Abdul Aziz Husain in China in 2007—were conceived on the assumption 
that Sarawak’s numerous rivers had the potential to produce 28,000 MW of hydropower 
(ibid.)22) as well as “clean” and cheap energy to power the demands of various heavy 
20) The deputy chairpersons of RECODA are the deputy chief minister and the second minister of 
planning and resource management.  The state secretary is the RECODA board secretary, while 
the state financial director and the State Planning Unit director are also board members of RECODA 
(RECODA 2015b).
21) These are functions that are focused primarily on the provision of public services, e.g., environmen-
tal, public, social, and developmental services (UN ESCAP 1998).
22) Sarawak also has an abundance of coal (estimated at 1.46 billion tonnes) and natural gas (40.9 trillion 
cubic feet) (RECODA 2012).
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industries such as aluminum smelting and steel, which had been identified as the back-
bone industries within SCORE.
Of the 52 major HEP dams planned for the state, 3 have already been completed 
(Batang Ai, Bakun, and Murum).  A fourth (Baram) was under initial phase of construction 
until its cancellation in early 2016.  Seven other HEP dams are in their feasibility planning 
stages: Limbang, Balleh, Lawas, Belaga, Menjawa, Pelagus, and Punan Bah (SIWRM 
Master Plan 2008).  Another recently completed dam, Bengoh, located about 50 km 
outside Kuching, is not an HEP dam but one designed to meet the raw water needs of 
the growing capital city and its hinterlands until 2030.
And yet, deep concerns remain that most of these HEP dams are unsustainable and 
will have a negative impact upon local communities and the environment (Mongabay 
2009; BMF 2010, 2012a; 2014).  All of these dams have been, or currently are, reliant 
upon foreign investment or foreign technological expertise for their development.  We 
examine four—namely, Batang Ai, Bakun, Murum, and Baram—to draw lessons from 
them.  It is to these issues that we now turn.
Batang Ai Dam: Impact and Environmental Footprint
Completed in 1985, the 110-meter-high Batang Ai HEP dam “has a water surface area 
of 84 km2, a water volume of 750 million m3, and a mean depth of 44 m” (Ling et al. 2012). 
Its reservoir inundated approximately 21,000 acres of land and displaced more than 3,000 
indigenous people from some 26 longhouses (Avang 1999; First Peoples Worldwide 
2012).  Costing US$236 million, it was financed by federal government funds (US$44.8 
million) and the Employees Provident Fund23) (US$57.3 million) and received loans of 
US$44.8 million, US$40.4 million, US$36.3 million, US$9.9 million, and US$2.2 million 
from the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, the Asian Development Bank, 
the Mitsui Trust Banking Company (Mitsui), the Australian Export Finance and Insur-
ance Corporation, and the English Export Credit Guarantee Department respectively 
(Hong 1987, in Avang 1999).
Sarawak’s first HEP dam, Batang Ai has four turbines (4 × 23 MW) with a total 
electricity-generating capacity of 92 MW of power (Avang 1999).  Pre-feasibility studies 
for Batang Ai were provided by the Australian engineering consultancy Snowy Mountains 
Engineering Corporation (SMEC) beginning in 1973, with the feasibility study completed 
in 1978.  SMEC listed its clients for this project as the Australian Development Assis-
tance Bureau and Sarawak Electricity Supply Corporation (SMEC Malaysia 2007–12).  A 
23) The Employees Provident Fund is the sole social security and pension fund set up by the federal 
government, under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance, to manage the mandatory retirement 
contributions of the private sector in Malaysia.
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joint venture, Maeda-Okumura, began construction of Batang Ai dam in 1981; water 
impoundment started in 1984 and power generation in 1985 (CIWRHR 2009).  Since then, 
the state government-owned Sarawak Energy Berhad (SEB),24) the owner of Batang Ai, 
has proposed enhancing the power-generation capacity of Batang Ai by a further 80 MW 
via an extension of two power turbines (2 × 40 MW) by constructing a “separate power 
waterway system with an intake, a tunnel, a penstock and a powerhouse” (ibid.).  This 
extension is aimed at meeting “peak loads in the power grid” (ibid.).25)
According to Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM), 22 local indigenous communities were 
displaced by this project; 10 communities relocated in 1982 and the remaining 12 in 1984 
(SAM 1998, in Avang 1999).  Other local communities that were not inundated by the 
dam impoundment either chose to stay or moved to higher ground.  They were, nonethe-
less, also affected, when their traditional transportation routes were cut off by the rising 
waters of the dam reservoir.
Available research suggests that the Batang Ai HEP dam resettlement scheme has 
not brought about much benefit to those resettled but instead has caused great hardship 
to the affected population.  Ngidang (1996) noted that
about 1,595 families were resettled in a land scheme, with each family allocated 4.5 hectares of 
farmland: 2ha of rubber, 1.2ha of cocoa and 0.4ha for a garden plot, while the remaining 0.8ha for 
rice cultivation is yet to be given.  The cocoa farm scheme was abandoned after cocoa price plunged 
in the 1980s and has since been replanted with oil palm . . . although the resettlement scheme 
provided facilities and infrastructure, the farm scheme had not been able to provide a sustainable 
income for the settlers.  Besides, the lack of land for rice cultivation seemed to add to the problem 
of food insecurity.  The aquaculture project in Batang Ai has long been discontinued for lack of 
funding and found to be not viable due to the high cost of feed and limited market outlets. (Ngidang 
1996, in Jarrow 2010)
Similarly, Avang Itik’s (1999) short study of two indigenous communities to assess 
the sociocultural impacts of the Batang Ai Hydroelectric Project and its resettlement 
scheme found that most of those resettled did not have firm resettlement contracts but 
merely verbal assurances from the government.  Land compensation was set at an unre-
alistically low rate of RM300/acre.  On average, those resettled received approximately 
RM30,000 per family while those who were not resettled received about RM10,000 
(Avang 1999).  Ngidang (1996), however, states that the “average compensation in the 
‘Danger Zone’ area was about RM90,000 per family and about RM62,000 per family in 
24) For information on Sarawak Energy Berhad (SEB), see footnote 1.
25) Although China Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research (CIWRHR) dispatched 
some technical staff to Sarawak to undertake site visits and surveys in 2008, it is unclear whether 
the project extension was ever undertaken or completed as no further information is available.
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the ‘Partial Danger Zone’” (Ngidang 1996, in Avang 1999).  Most of those resettled also 
did not receive the amount of land promised after they moved from their native custom-
ary rights (NCR) lands into the resettlement areas.  Many resettlers felt shortchanged 
by the government.  This issue has since consistently been part of election campaign 
discourses in the parliamentary constituency of Lubok Antu and state constituency of 
Batang Ai in all elections since the 1990s (Yi 2009).
As well, resettlers discovered that with the building of the dam came massive socio-
environmental changes that forced major lifestyle changes upon them.  They found they 
had to pay for their new homes, which cost RM36,000 each.  Instead of being compensated 
for the loss of their inundated homes, resettled families found that the government’s 
compensation of RM8,000 per house was used as a down payment for their new homes, 
with the government expecting resettled families to pay the difference via monthly 
installments.  Many have been unable to pay.  Resettlers also discovered that they had 
to pay for water and electricity supply despite earlier government promises of free utili-
ties in the resettlement areas.
Early efforts by the Sarawak Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority 
 (SALCRA) to assist the resettled Batang Ai communities via cocoa and rubber plantations 
also failed.  These cocoa and rubber plantation programs were “delayed by several years 
due to the lack of staff and labor, and difficulties in obtaining planting material.  The cocoa 
plantations failed before 1989” (ADB 1999, 11) before being replanted with oil palm.  Nor 
has the SALCRA oil palm scheme in the resettlement area benefited the resettlers, as they 
have never managed to earn enough income from SALCRA (Ngidang 1996, in Jarrow 2010). 
After 10 years of their SALCRA plantation projects, resettled families earned a mere
RM230 a month compared with the income (RM523 a month) that was envisaged from plantations 
after 10 years.  This also compared unfavorably with the average monthly family income of RM675 
of those who continued to live in native customary rights lands in upstream Batang Ai (without the 
Project). (ADB 1999, 11)
Complicating matters, many also realized that they now lived in a pure cash economy 
as opposed to their former lives in which they were able to rely upon the forest to supple-
ment their food and other needs.  With higher expenses, insufficient income from their 
land crops, and burdensome debt, a majority of resettlers in Batang Ai have not managed 
to cope and have not managed to extricate themselves from poverty.  Consequently, the 
Batang Ai HEP dam resettlement has long been regarded as a socioeconomic failure 
(Ngidang 1996, in Jarrow 2010; The Borneo Post, May 19, 2013), with resettled families 
having to live in areas with severe environmental and social challenges that place stress 
upon their lives and their cultural identities (ADB 1999).
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Environmentally as well, Batang Ai has problems.  The inundation of the dam pro-
ceeded without its biomass being cleared.  Consequently, Batang Ai has already contrib-
uted serious levels of hydrogen sulfide and methane into the atmosphere (and continues 
to do so), with potential impacts on global warming.  Absurdly, there have been few 
studies on the levels of methane and hydrogen sulfide produced in Batang Ai since it was 
commissioned.  As such, little is known about Batang Ai’s damaging global environmen-
tal footprint.  A recent local study, however, found that Batang Ai continues to produce 
and harbor copious amounts of toxic hydrogen sulfide in its waters, with levels rising in 
proportion to water depth (Ling et al. 2012).  Although the levels have decreased over 
the years compared to an earlier study in 1995 (Pusin 1995, in Ling et al. 2012), “the 
irritating smell of hydrogen sulphide has been detected at the reservoir, at outflow and 
at a downstream town of Lubok Antu” (Ling et al. 2012, 24).  After testing the water, the 
study found that “58% of the hydrogen sulphide concentrations observed in the various 
test sites of the dam exceeded US EPA recommended values of 2 μg/L” (ibid., 27).  Such 
concentrations posed a toxic hazard to aquaculture, especially in the event of an “upwell-
ing or mixing of water where the high sulphide level is brought to the culture zone with 
anoxic water” (ibid.).
Although methane is also being produced and emitted at the Batang Ai reservoir, 
there are as yet no known studies on the levels of methane.26)  There are also no publicly 
available studies on sedimentation, fish migrations, or non-native and invasive species 
of flora and fauna upstream of the dam.  Similarly, no known studies have been undertaken 
on the impact of changes of downstream river flows upon the natural and human com-
munities and environments of the Batang Ai River.
What little is known is that Batang Ai has seen the disappearance of several “large 
migratory fish species adapted to fast-moving water [which] now appear to be rare or 
nonexistent in the reservoir and the upper reaches” (ADB 1999, 10) of the dam.  As well, 
the introduction of exotic fish species such as tilapia in cage aquaculture
poses a long-term risk to the fisheries in the reservoir and downstream, as this species can over-
populate.  Fish cage culture and lack of proper clearing of vegetation from the reservoir have 
contributed to the anoxic conditions of the reservoir.  Conditions for aquatic life in the Batang Ai 
River below the dam are poor due to a lack of minimum flow releases during the dry season and 
periodic bouts of poor water quality characterized by hydrogen sulfide and possibly reduced dis-
solved oxygen. (ibid.)
26) The continued high levels of biochemical oxygen demand detected in Batang Ai suggest that decom-
position of biomass continues with bacteria consuming the submerged organic matter.  Hydrogen 
sulfide and methane are by-products of this process.  As noted by the US EPA, methane is emitted 
from a number of natural sources, with wetlands being the largest source since they emit methane 
as a consequence of decomposing organic materials in the absence of oxygen (US EPA 2012).
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Bakun HEP Dam: Impact and Environmental Footprint
Located on the Balui River, a tributary of the mighty Rejang River, the Bakun HEP dam 
is the second-highest concrete-faced rockfill dam in the world.  With eight power tunnels 
delivering water to eight 300 MW turbines, Bakun is capable of producing 2,400 MW of 
electricity (BNHP 2011).  Bakun rises to a height of 207 m, has a catchment area of 
14,750 km2, and has a reservoir surface area of nearly 700 km2, nearly the surface area of 
Singapore.  Its reservoir fill volume is 16.71 million m3, with a gross storage volume of 
43,800 million m3 (EcoKnights 2010).
First mooted in the 1960s, work on the controversial HEP dam began in 1986 but 
was crippled and shelved in 1990, revived in 1993, stopped in 1997, and revived again in 
2000, due to a lack of demand for electricity, serious financial constraints, economic 
recessions, and regional financial crises.  The project was finally completed in 2011 when 
Sinohydro, a state-owned enterprise from China, got involved via a Malaysia-China joint-
venture company after various Malaysian public-private joint ventures had failed (Inter-
national Rivers n.d., Bakun Dam).
From design until completion, Bakun saw the involvement of both the federal and 
state governments and their agencies, major investors, consultants, and contractors, 
domestic as well as foreign.  Both the federal and state governments (along with their 
agencies) invested huge sums of public funds into Bakun.  Some of the better-known 
domestic agencies/companies that invested resources into the project included Ekran 
Berhad; Bakun Hydroelectric Corporation (a joint venture comprising Malaysia’s national 
power corporation, Tenaga Nasional Berhad [TNB]; Sarawak Electricity Supply Corpora-
tion [SESCO]; and Malaysia Mining Corporation [MMC]) (Sulaiman 2013).  Global Upline 
Bhd, Sarawak Hidro, and Malaysia-China Hydro JV (comprising Sime Engineering Bhd, 
Sinohydro Corporation of China, WCT Bhd, MTD Capital, Ahmad Zaki Resources, 
 Syarikat Ismail, and Edward & Sons) were also involved (The Malay Mail, December 1, 
2004).
All these companies, whether government-linked (e.g., TNB, SESCO, and MMC) 
or privately owned, were closely connected to various political interests close to the 
governing coalition (federal and state level) Barisan Nasional or to then Chief Minister 
Abdul Taib Mahmud and then Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (Gomez 1999; 
Brown 2001; How et al. 2013).27)  Many of these companies had proven track records in 
completing various large financial, engineering, and construction projects.  They also 
formed the political-economic vanguard of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s grand strategy of 
27) For example, Ekran and Global Upline were owned by Ting Pek Khiing, who is known to be a close 
associate of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad; MTD Capital, Ahmad Zaki Resources, Syarikat Ismail, and 
Edward & Sons were all politically linked companies (How et al. 2013).
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modernizing Malaysia via industrialization and mega-construction projects (Gomez and 
Jomo 1997; Milne and Mauzy 1999; Wain 2009).
Some of the better-known foreign companies involved with Bakun included SAMA 
Consortium German Agency for Technical Cooperation, Snowy Mountains Engineering 
Coporation (Australia), Harza Engineering LP (United States), Swedish-Swiss joint 
 venture Asea Brown Boveri (Switzerland), Companhia Brasileira de Projetos e Obras 
 (Brazil), Lahmeyer (Germany), DongAh (Korea), IMPSA (Argentina), and Alstom 
(France) (Allison 2000).
Bakun has proven controversial.  Its sheer size has drawn international odium ever 
since the World Bank and the World Commission on Dams both eschewed any further 
involvement with large dams as “dam projects face on average cost-overruns of 56%, 
that promoters systematically exaggerate benefits and that 55% of the analysed dams 
generated less power than projected” (BMF 2012a, 7).  Officially Bakun cost RM7.4 bil-
lion (Sovacool and Bulan 2011; Malay Mail Online, October 2, 2013), although critics 
suggest the project cost closer to RM15 billion (BMF 2012a; Asia Sentinel, April 24, 
2012).  The exact total amount of public funds expended for the completion of this project, 
however, remains unknown.  What is known is that the federal government paid about 
US$250 million compensation to Bakun Hydroelectric Corporation and its foreign con-
tractors, Asea Brown Boveri, Companhia Brasileira de Projetos e Obras, and DongAh of 
South Korea to rescue the project from its myriad disputes and delays (Allison 2000; 
Swain and Ang 2004).28)  Bakun was ultimately completed with financial support from 
various Malaysian government pension funds and the China Export Import Bank (Inter-
national Rivers n.d., Bakun Dam).
Such massive expenditures without accountability suggest that when it came to 
mega-development projects linked to political interests, financial costs were not the 
priority of the Malaysian government.  Instead, crony political business links were.  In a 
2005 report, Transparency International branded the project “‘a monument of corruption’ 
citing years of delays, ownership changes and overall costs that more than doubled” (Free 
Malaysia Today, October 27, 2011).  A similar conclusion was reached by Bruno Manser 
Fonds (2012a) given the numerous politically connected companies involved in the con-
struction of the dam.  Indeed, one of the biggest beneficiaries of Bakun was the politically 
28) “Major construction contracts for the Bakun Dam project were given to Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), 
Companhia Brasileira de Projetos e Obras (CBPO), and DongAh of South Korea.  However, after 
the 1997 economic crisis hit Malaysia, these private companies received USD250 million as com-
pensation when the Malaysian Ministry of Finance decided to take over the project from BHC.  The 
revived Bakun HEP was taken over by Sarawak Hidro Sdn Bhd (SHSB) and its main contractor was 
Malaysia-China Joint Venture (MCH JV) for the civil works portion” (Swain and Ang 2004, 103).
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linked company Cahya Mata Sarawak,29) which has long had a monopoly on the supply of 
cement and steel in the state.  In 1996 it expanded its production capacities as a direct 
response to the building of Bakun (Aeria 2002).
Bakun has also been dogged by local and global criticism over the treatment of those 
resettled.  Over 10,000 indigenous people from 15 communities were relocated and 
resettled on account of the Bakun hydropower project.  Although intially given assurances 
and a raft of promises about a better life and future for their communities in the Bakun 
Resettlement Area at Sungei Asap, all were eventually shortchanged.  Despite the com-
munities being resettled in 1998, compensation for inundated NCR lands was delayed by 
over 14 years on account of uncertainty over how the compensation was calculated (Netto 
1998; The Borneo Post, June 17, 2012) and also because of local disputes over the size of 
each community’s and individual’s NCR landholdings and among individual claimants 
(Tawie 2010).
Most of those affected by the dam were resettled in a remote area with poor soil 
(rocky, sandy, and sloping land) in Sungei Asap.  Despite the government’s promise of 
three hectares of adequate land per family, each family was given only three acres of land; 
this was insufficient for hill rice cultivation (Hornbill Unleashed 2011).  All their efforts 
to plant traditional crops such as pepper, cocoa, dragon fruit, and ginger came to naught 
since the land was too poor to nurture any crop except oil palm.  To add insult to injury, 
all resettled families were told to pay between RM50,000 and RM60,000 for their indi-
vidual apartments in the longhouses built for them (The Borneo Post, November 9, 2010). 
Sungei Asap did have a school, a police post, a health clinic, and an agricultural office. 
But it still does not have a fire station, a post office, or a bank (SMLD and SALCO 2008).
Cut off from their traditional river environments where they had access to fishing 
and river transportation, forced to settle on poor soil, and constrained to pay for their 
new apartments in Sungei Asap, the resettled communities were effectively forced by 
the government into penury and hardship (Malaysiakini, September 17, 2010).  In other 
words, despite rosy official promises that construction of the dam would bring progress 
and development, once proud and dignified communities have been reduced to working 
as unskilled labor in nearby oil palm plantations and construction sites and waiting on 
coffee shop tables in urban areas.  Many residents who could not take the “bad living 
conditions” and the severe stress they encountered in their new lives in the resettlement 
area moved back to their traditional lands (Malaysiakini, July 6, 2013).
The near absence of sustained agricultural activity due to poor soil fertility in Sungei 
29) CMS is owned and controlled by the family of Sarawak Governor Abdul Taib Mahmud.  In the 1990s 
he was chief minister and led the Sarawak BN government (Aeria 2002).
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Asap, the absence of nearby markets for the villagers’ meager produce, and “a lack of 
employment and limited resources in the resettlement” (Jehom 2008, 152) has also meant 
that many longhouses of the Sungei Asap resettlement village are largely vacant except 
for a few old people with their grandchildren.30)  Adults of working age are rarely seen in 
Sungei Asap as most of them work as migrant labor in urban centers such as Bintulu, 
Sibu, Miri, Kota Kinabalu, Kuching, and farther afield in Singapore and Peninsular Malay-
sia.  These migrant workers return only once or twice a year, during festive periods. 
This serious labor outflow from rural areas to urban centers is made worse on account 
of the lack of waged employment in Sungei Asap, low wages, and poor educational 
achievement of the resettled communities (Baru 2012; The Borneo Post, June 17, 2012). 
Those who remain in Sungei Asap “imply a disappointment with the resettlement” 
(SMLD and SALCO 2008, 54).
In 2008, a study that examined the standard of living and quality of life in Sungei 
Asap found a “majority (55 percent) rated themselves as ‘middling’ (sedang), with a size-
able 39 percent rating their condition as ‘difficult’ (susah).”  The more nomadic Penan 
who had been resettled felt, without exception, that their living conditions were “difficult” 
and that they were worse off after resettlement (ibid., 54–55).  While resettlement had 
a positive impact31) on a small proportion (of those resettled), for the majority it had no 
impact or a negative one (ibid., 58).  Indeed, the study found that “resettlement had 
apparently not improved the standard of living of the majority, with only 10 per cent 
reporting themselves to be better off than five years ago” (ibid., 60).32)  The study also 
30) “Due to lack of employment and limited resources in the resettlement, seeking paid employment 
elsewhere seems to be the most common trend amongst the settlers.  After leaving school, married 
men and women seek employment of any sort to send money back to their family at the resettle-
ment.  The settlers also invest in education for their children hoping that one day when the children 
have jobs, they will send money home” (Jehom 2008, 152).  Welyne Jehom (2008) studied one 
community, the Kenyah-Badeng of Long Geng, who were involuntarily resettled in Sungei Asap by 
the Bakun Dam project.  Her findings of the Kenyah-Badeng are replicated throughout the other 
longhouse communities of Sungei Asap.  See also Soda (2001) for a discussion on this phenomenon 
of declining agricultural activities with rural-urban out-migration of labor in the Iban village com-
munity of Rantau-Kemiding, Kanowit, Sarawak.
31) This was mainly in the form of tarred roads, schools, and health clinics (SMLD and SALCO 2008).
32) That is, compared to 2003, since the study was undertaken in 2008.  Basically, those resettled in 
Bakun were deeply unhappy with being forced into a fully-cash economy where they had to pay for 
everything when previously they could access resources from the forests.  As well, they were deeply 
unhappy with the lack of adequate and timely compensation for their lands and homes; being forced 
into long-term debt by paying for their low-quality housing, which was inferior to that of their 
original villages; and paying for the monthly provision of electricity and water (which was promised 
to them for free).  Taken together, this along with the fragmentation of their original communities 
in Sungei Asap due to the resettlement and the out-migration of people in search of monthly cash 
wages represented a severe drop in the quality of their lives (SMLD and SALCO 2008).  See also The 
Borneo Post (June 29, 2012) for a journalist’s personal reflection on “The Sungei Asap Experience.”
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concluded that, apart from incomes and ownership of consumer durables, there were 
likely to be “other more psycho-social, or cultural matters relating to a sense of well-
being” (ibid.).  The Sungei Asap resettlement area today does not reflect the rich cultural 
diversity and communal intermeshing of rural life that was once the hallmark of indige-
nous society along the Balui River basin.33)
Along with unhappy Sungei Asap residents who moved back into their traditional 
homelands, there were about 189 families from five longhouses within the Bakun catch-
ment who refused to move to Sungei Asap.  All these people moved to higher grounds 
on their NCR lands that lay within the Bakun reservoir and catchment area (Malaysiakini, 
September 28, 2010).  These higher grounds, hilltops, soon became islands (hilltop-
islands) within the Bakun reservoir once the dam was impounded to its full capacity. 
Consequently, many of these indigenous communities now live on homemade houseboats 
(jelatongs)—built with floating logs and large plastic jerry cans—in the dam reservoir lake 
or tributaries, their houseboats tethered to their hilltop-island NCR lands.
Visits to the hilltop-island jelatongs confirm that these floating communities, with a 
total population numbering in the hundreds (Malaysiakini, July 6, 2013), do not have 
access to any clean water, electricity, fuel, sanitation, or public services.  Located hours 
away by boat from the dam, these communities face lives that are “deplorable and 
 inhumane” (Kedit 2012).  They rely completely on rainwater, as the reservoir water is 
“polluted, foul-smelling and muddy.  Their only source of clean water is from heaven; 
rain-water collected in plastic tanks fitted with piping to supply the main hut” (ibid.). 
There are public health signs warning these communities against drinking or swimming 
in the reservoir water “because of the risk of Melioidosis and Leptospirosis” (Sarawak 
Report, November 25, 2012).  Toilets are holes cut into the floor of the jelatongs that 
empty straight into the dam.  The only source of electricity is generator sets powered by 
gasoline, which has to be purchased from shops near the dam, hours away by boat—a 
dam that produces surplus energy that the communities cannot access (ibid.).  Given 
their remote location, children in these communities do not have access to schools.  Nor 
do the sick have access to health clinics or hospitals.  As for food, the jelatong communi-
ties cultivate hill rice on nearby hilltop-islands.  And they have a plentiful supply of fish, 
although little is known about how healthy these fish are.  Comprehensive studies on the 
health and nutritional status of these impoverished and marginalized communities are 
currently lacking.
33) See also the report by the Coalition of Concerned NGOs on Bakun (Gabungan), Malaysia (1999) 
titled “The Resettlement of Indigenous People Affected by the Bakun Hydro-Electric Project, 
Sarawak, Malaysia” as well as the Borneo Project, “Broken Promises at Sungai Asap Resettlement,” 
http://borneoproject.org/updates/broken-promises-at-sungai-asap.
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Adding to the woes of these remote jelatong communities are plans by the state 
government to gazette their watery homelands and adjoining hilltop-islands into a “Bakun 
Islands National Park.”  A total of 18 islands within the Bakun dam area are affected 
(Malaysiakini, July 6, 2013).  Effectively, this action will deprive all the remaining indig-
enous communities living within the Bakun reservoir area of their NCR rights and 
 privileges (ibid.) as well as access to agricultural lands and fishing grounds, since such 
activities would not be allowed in a national park.  Instead, the islands in the park “would 
eventually be developed into eco-tourism areas so that the locals can venture into the 
tourism sector” (The Borneo Post, March 1, 2012).  The local state assemblyman and 
Assistant Minister of Culture and Heritage Liwan Lagang pledges to safeguard the rights 
of local people affected by this National Park gazettement since the decision to gazette 
the islands was really to “preserve them for the benefit of all the people affected by the 
Bakun dam” (The Borneo Post, July 8, 2013).
One cannot help but consider this a perverse argument to sugarcoat what would 
effectively be an action to dispossess indigenous peoples of even their marginal lands and 
impoverished existence so as to allow politicians and their business cronies free and 
unhindered access to new “tourist playgrounds.”  Other more callous politicians have 
simply chastised the native jelatong communities, telling them to “change their lifestyles” 
since the “government could not simply cede land to the native community because it 
involved a large area” (Malaysiakini, July 11, 2013).34)
Upon inundation, Bakun’s reservoir flooded over 700 km2 of forestlands and river 
valleys.  Reportedly, the biomass in this reservoir was not cleared before inundation, 
which means the dam has since become a huge producer of hydrogen sulfide, methane, 
and carbon dioxide gas.  Like in Batang Ai, a scientific hydrological study undertaken in 
Bakun in January 2012 found the following:
[T]he reservoir is stratified and thermocline occurred at a shallow depth of about 5 m.  pH of  stations 
in the reservoir subsurface were all below 6 and at 5–6 m depth the pH was the lowest ranging 
between 5.1–5.5 indicating acidic conditions.  Turbidity in the reservoir increased with depth and 
was high in the inflow from upstream and tributaries due to suspended solids.  Dissolved Oxygen 
(DO) at subsurface dropped to anoxic conditions rapidly at 1 m to 4 m depths.  Decomposition of 
submerged carbonaceous materials is the predominant factor in the acidic condition and low DO 
observed.  Due to low DO and low pH, the reservoir is not yet suitable for cage culture activities. 
(Lee et al. 2012, 96)
34) “If you give the land to these people just because they have been roaming in the area, then are we 
going to send everybody else to the sea?” (Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar, MP for Santubong) (Malay-
siakini, July 11, 2013).
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There were no readings taken of methane and hydrogen sulfide levels in this study, 
although the “rotten egg smell of hydrogen sulfide was detected during sampling” (ibid., 
94).  The extent of these gas emissions and its huge global environmental footprint thus 
remain unknown, although the pervasive stench of hydrogen sulfide even kilometers 
away from the dam and its reservoir suggests large volumes of emissions.  International 
Rivers, a global NGO that campaigns against mega-dams, suggests that the water in 
Bakun’s reservoir is saturated with nitrogen on account of a large amount of inundated 
biomass and fertilizer runoff from the huge oil palm plantations above the reservoir. 
These nitrogen deposits have reportedly made the waters of Bakun acidic and have begun 
to corrode the power turbines (International Rivers n.d., Bakun Dam).  Lee et al., how-
ever, suggest that the low pH values of the Bakun reservoir are likely due to “sulphide 
oxidising into sulphuric acid” (Lee et al. 2012, 94).
Whatever the case, there is little doubt that the high level of acidity does have an 
impact.  The Bakun reservoir is presently unsuitable for “aquaculture due to the anoxic 
condition at such a shallow depth, low pH and high turbidity” (ibid., 92).  However, as in 
the case of Batang Ai, there are no presently known or publicly available comprehensive 
studies of the impact of the Bakun reservoir or water flow upon the downstream riparian 
environment, upon the flora and fauna of the river, or upon nearby human settlements 
that rely upon the river.
Nonetheless, taken as a whole, one can surmise that the traditional lifestyles and 
cultural heritage of the tribal communities of the Balui River that were once intricately 
linked to their forest environment have been transformed drastically by the very dam 
that was supposed to bring them “development.”  As well, despite the claims of the 
environmental friendliness of hydropower, the reality is that the Bakun dam produces 
huge amounts of methane, hydrogen sulfide, and carbon dioxide from all the inundated 
rotting biomass—gases that probably have a very high global environmental cost given 
their impact upon the ozone layer and contribution to global warming and climate 
change.
The Murum and Baram HEP Dams: Impact 35)
Keen on securing electricity power supply for SCORE’s reportedly many industrial inves-
tors, especially large aluminum smelters, the Sarawak government commissioned the 
Murum and Baram dams in 2008 and 2013 respectively.
The Murum HEP dam has a power-generating capacity of 944 MW and was com-
35) As far as is known, there have not been any environmental impact studies evaluating the dam’s 
environmental footprint.  If any have been carried out, their reports have not been made available.
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pleted in 2013.  Developed by Sarawak Energy Berhad, the dam was built by Sinohydro 
Corporation under the supervision of the China Three Gorges Corporation.  Sinohydro 
Corporation is one of China’s major hydropower engineering and construction companies, 
and it works closely with Sarawak Energy Berhad.  In 2013 Sinohydro Corporation estab-
lished a joint venture with Trenergy Infrastructure Sdn Bhd, a wholly owned unit of 
Sarawak Cable and Sarawak Energy Berhad.  Sarawak Cable is owned by Mahmud Bekir 
Taib, a son of Governor Abdul Taib Mahmud.36)
Reportedly, no social or environmental impact assessments were undertaken until 
after the dam project was commissioned, and none have been made publicly available. 
The Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for Murum was also commissioned after the Murum 
dam project began, in complete defiance of all internationally recognized protocols gov-
erning the resettlement and treatment of indigenous peoples (International Rivers 2012; 
Sarawak Report, September 28, 2012).  The UNDRIP37) explicitly requires that indigenous 
peoples be fully consulted and development plans disclosed before any construction 
begins.
Built along the Murum River above the Bakun dam, the Murum dam has submerged 
eight Penan settlements totaling about 1,500 persons, forcing these semi-nomadic 
 peoples into giving up their traditional forest-related lifestyles (International Rivers n.d., 
Murum Dam).  Complicating matters has been the fact that the RAP proposed pitiful 
compensation for those to be resettled, granting them a mere RM500/month per family 
for four years.  The RAP assumed that those resettled would by then be able to carve 
out their own livelihoods.
The RAP did not take into account that the alternative lands the Penan were to be 
resettled upon, namely, the Tengulang and Metalun resettlement areas, had already been 
allocated to various large commercial oil palm plantation companies.  Cultivation of oil 
palm in these areas has already begun, raising concerns about whether the 14 hectares 
of land supposed to be allocated to each resettled family under the RAP will even mate-
rialize.
36) In February 2014, Sarawak Energy awarded a major contract worth RM619 million for the construc-
tion of the “500 kV transmission backbone project” to a joint venture comprising Sinohydro Corp 
(M) Sdn Bhd and Trenergy Infrastructure Sdn Bhd (The Star, February 27, 2014).  Both these 
companies have worked on other major infrastructure projects since 2008, namely, the Bakun-
Similajau and Murum Junction Transmission Line Projects (Sarawak Energy 2014).  Sinohydro 
Corporation is also a key partner of the Malaysia-China Hydro Joint Venture Consortium.
37) Other key international protocols are those of the World Bank Operational Policies, the International 
Finance Corporation Performance Standards, and the Millenium Development Goals—all of which 
provide clear standards and guidelines for the resettlement of indigenous communities and poverty 
erradication (Sarawak Report, September 28, 2012).
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The secrecy and lack of disclosure evident in the Murum RAP thus raised ques-
tions about whether all the development proposals for new resettlement townships in 
Tengulang and Metalun were going to materialize.  In the light of the poor resettlement 
schemes of Batang Ai and Bakun, Sarawak Energy has been accused of human rights 
violations, land theft, and the institutionalization of poverty under the guise of develop-
ment promises (BMF 2012a; Sarawak Report, September 28, 2012).
Hence, when news leaked in late 2012 that the Sarawak government and Sarawak 
Energy Berhad were going ahead with the construction of the 1,200 MW Baram dam, it 
sparked large and sustained protests from numerous communities in the Ulu Baram 
region, where the dam is to be built.  Once completed, the Baram dam reservoir, cover-
ing approximately 388 km2, will submerge 26 villages and displace over 20,000 indigenous 
people.  Access roads are already being built to the dam site even as social and environ-
mental impact assessments are being undertaken.  In other words, the decision to go 
ahead with the Baram dam paid scant respect to the interests and livelihoods of the 
indigenous communities that would be affected by the dam.  Members of the native 
 communities of the Baram River basin blockaded the access roads to the Baram dam site 
(Sarawak Report 2014).
Such a dismissive approach toward the local community gave rise to a social move-
ment against not only the Baram dam but all the other 52 dams proposed in Sarawak. 
Save Rivers, a coalition of local NGOs and individuals, has actively campaigned against 
the Baram dam and in favor of saving all Sarawak’s rivers from being dammed up for 
hydropower.  Although not very successful, its vigorous press campaign in Australia 
against Hydro Tasmania (an Australian company and Sarawak Energy’s strategic partner 
in the construction of the Baram dam project) did lead to the withdrawal of Hydro 
 Tasmania from the Baram project (BMF 2012b).38)  Other companies, such as SMEC, 
GHD (both from Australia), MWH Global (United States), Fichtner Gmbh (Germany), 
and Norconsult (Norway), that conducted feasibility studies for the dams have also come 
under fire (BMF 2012a).  As well, protests at the International Hydropower Association’s 
congress in Sarawak in May 2013 (Save Rivers 2013b) questioned the global association’s 
commitment to sustainable use of hydropower (Save Rivers 2013a).
Save Rivers and its Switzerland-based campaign partner, Bruno Manser Fonds, also 
revealed that Sarawak Energy had awarded US$226 million in infrastructure dam and 
electricity-transmission related construction contracts to companies closely linked to the 
38) The Australian consultancy company Hydro Tasmania seconded several key staff to Sarawak 
Energy, including the Murum dam project director and the senior project manager for the proposed 
Baram and Baleh dams (BMF 2012b).
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chief minister’s family, namely, Sarawak Cable, Cahya Mata Sarawak, and Naim Holdings 
(BMF 2013c).39)  Questions raised by legislators in the state assembly about whether 
Baram or any other hydropower dam in the state had been subject to cost-benefit ana lyses 
to establish its investment viability never elicited any concrete response (Free Malaysia 
Today, May 23, 2013).40)  The Sarawak government also seemingly remains bent on 
ignoring the global environmental costs of these dams.  Hence, despite controversial 
contracts, alleged corruption, unresolved environmental issues, and global protests, the 
Sarawak state government remains intent on proceeding with the construction of the 
Baram and other dams.41)
It seems that downstream investors in SCORE (and the accompanying spin-off ben-
efits to local investors) are more important to the state government than the forests, the 
rivers, and the overall physical environment that supports the lives and livelihoods of its 
own indigenous peoples.
V Downstream Investors in SCORE
Since its establishment, SCORE has grown with the involvement of various local and 
foreign investors.  No exact figures are available on the total amount of investment poured 
into SCORE.  However, five key investors have already set up factories and smelters in 
SCORE, principally in the Samalaju Industrial Park.  Four are major foreign investors, 
while the fifth is a Malaysian company (see Table 5).  The third-largest mining con-
glomerate in the world, Australian-owned Rio Tinto, abandoned its plan to set up a US$2 
billion joint-venture aluminum smelter in Sarawak.  It pulled out of SCORE in March 
2012 after failing to come to an agreement over “commercial power supply terms” with 
Sarawak Energy Bhd (Free Malaysia Today, March 27, 2012).
39) Such crony business contract awards are not unusual in Sarawak and have been ongoing for decades. 
For further information on these business practices and the links between politicians and businesses 
in Sarawak, see Aeria (2002), Mersat (2005), and the Web sites noted in footnote 14.
40) A ministerial reply in the state assembly insists that a cost-benefit analysis was carried out but that 
“under normal circumstances, it was not a business practice to make the cost-benefit analysis 
public” (The Borneo Post, May 28, 2013).
41) An informative Australian documentary by SBS Dateline titled The Last Frontier focuses on the 
construction of the Bakun dam before moving on to discuss the corporate links between business 
and politicians in Sarawak and Tasmania in the planning and construction of the proposed Baram 
dam.  It lucidly exposes how a nexus of politics and business in search of profits disempowers local 
indigenous people of Sarawak in the name of development that transforms the natural environment 
of Sarawak in a massive way.  See The Last Frontier here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
87Ed2da5hLs.
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Of the five above-mentioned companies, only Press Metal Sarawak42) has been fully 
operational since 2009.  However, since then it has been accused of seriously polluting 
the Balingian River (The Borneo Post, July 16, 2012), causing the death of nearby forests, 
and adversely affecting the respiratory health of nearby villagers—all of which Press 
Metal Sarawak has vigorously denied (The Borneo Post, May 8, 2012).43)
Apart from such environmental fears, SCORE also does not inspire investor confi-
dence.  Specifically, although there is an availability of excess power from Bakun, there 
are serious investor concerns that supply is not guaranteed.  This has raised the risk 
profile for investors in SCORE.  In late June 2013, a major power outage that originated 
with the Bakun HEP dam led to a complete failure of the electrical grid throughout the 
state (New Straits Times, June 28, 2013; The Borneo Post, June 28, 2013).  This power 
outage caused major damage to the Press Metal aluminum smelter, when loss of power 
for almost six hours caused “solidification in the reduction cells of all its potlines” (PMB 
2013).  This shutdown of Press Metal’s aluminum production lines forced the 
120,000 tonne/annum facility to shut down production for six months for reconstruction 
works.  Press Metal’s profits and credibility took a major hit, with its 2013 net profit 
estimated to fall to RM36.6 million from RM138.4 million previously (The Star, July 3, 
42) Press Metal Sarawak (PMS) is a subsidiary of Press Metal Berhad (PMB), which owns 80 percent 
of PMS shares.  PMB is a Malaysia-based aluminum company with an extensive global presence. 
Set up in 1986 as a privately owned local aluminum extrusion company, it has grown into a globally 
integrated enterprise comprising both upstream smelting capacity and downstream extrusion, dis-
tribution, and trading of aluminum products.  PMB is majority owned and controlled by the Koon 
family (PMB 2013).  The remaining 20 percent of PMS shares are held by Sumitomo Corporation 
(PMB 2010).
43) Some villagers with the assistance of a local NGO, Peoplesdocumentary (2012), posted a YouTube 
video titled Pollution from Aluminium Smelting Plant at Balingian, Mukah with these allegations, 
available here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8wJJx2ng-Yo.
Table 5 Key Investors in SCORE (2013)
Company Product Constructiona) Productionb) Key Owners
Press Metal Sarawak Aluminum ingots  
and billets
Q1 2011  
(new plant)
Q4 2012 Malaysian
Tokuyama Corporation Polycrystalline silicone Q1 2011 Q3 2013 Japanese
Asia Minerals Limited Silicone, manganese Q3 2011 Q4 2012 Hong Kong
OM Holdings Ltd. Silicone, manganese Q2 2012 Q2 2013 Singaporean,  
Australian
Asia Advanced Materials Metallic silicone Q4 2013 Korean
Source: RECODA (2013).
Notes: a) Year that the factory was to be constructed.  Q1 is the first quarter of the year followed by Q2, Q3, 
and Q4.
b) Year that the factory was to start production.
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2013).  Businesses throughout the state of Sarawak (along with two million residents) 
also were badly affected by the power outage, with damage estimated at hundreds of 
millions of ringgit—a situation made worse when one realizes that all the HEP dams in 
the state were built with public funds with the expressed aim of ensuring a stable power 
supply.
The Sarawak state government nonetheless continues to claim that SCORE, pow-
ered by renewable hydroelectric power, will provide numerous employment and develop-
ment benefits to the state’s labor force.  In early 2009, then Chief Minister Abdul Taib 
Mahmud said, “SCORE’s main energy intensive industries are expected to create 1.5 
million job opportunities for skilled, technical and professional workers by 2030” (Edge 
Daily, October 15, 2008).  In June 2013, Abdul Taib Mahmud further claimed that the 
“construction of hydro electric dams” would “reverse rural-urban drift and transform the 
basic infrastructure of the interior of the state” (The Borneo Post, June 18, 2013).  Yet, an 
exploratory news article in July 2014 crisply summarized that most of the benefits to be 
gained through SCORE were being captured by politically well connected infrastructure 
contractors44) while most of the skilled jobs were being filled by foreign workers and West 
Malaysians.  Similarly, the unskilled work was being secured by cheap foreign contract 
workers who were brought in on fixed-term work contracts (Malaysian Insider, July 17, 
2014).45)  The Malaysian Trade Union Congress (Sarawak Branch) has long been con-
cerned about this influx and has called for higher wages and better working conditions 
for Sarawak labor even as it denounced the decision of the state government and employ-
ers to deprive locals of jobs in the timber and plantation sectors, where up to “75 per cent 
of workers are foreign workers” (The Borneo Post, May 4, 2014).46)
44) “Sarawak lawmaker Chiew Chiu Sing said ‘in reality, Samalaju was a boon for big industries and 
Malaysian companies with high connections.  Support industries such as those building and operat-
ing the workers camp in Samalaju and those constructing the roads there have all been cornered 
by companies close to Sarawak politicians’” (Malaysian Insider, July 17, 2014).
45) In late 2014, the Malaysian government backed by the Sarawak state government signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding to pave the way for the import of 12,000 Bangladeshi workers for the oil 
palm plantation sector on top of the 5,000 Bangladeshis already working in the state (The Star, 
October 21, 2014).  The state government justified this move citing a severe shortage of labor 
(30,000 jobs) in the oil palm plantation sector even as “tens of thousands of Sarawakians” continued 
to leave the state and their families in search of better wages and employment conditions in Singa-
pore, Johor, Kuala Lumpur, and Penang (The Borneo Post, May 4, 2014).
46) There are no accurate figures on the number of foreign workers (legal and otherwise) in Malaysia. 
Estimates put the figure at anything between three million (The Borneo Post, May 4, 2014) and six 
million (The Borneo Post, November 26, 2014).
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VI Conclusion
Sarawak’s economic dynamism and growth pattern have dramatically reduced poverty 
and hard-core poverty levels.  Nevertheless, they have not eliminated poverty.  Indeed, 
Sarawak’s current pattern of development has seen persistent poverty, deepening 
inequality, and environmental degradation amidst the emergence of a small nouveau 
riche class closely associated with the state’s political elite (Aeria 2002; 2013; Straumann 
2014).
With its publicly articulated desire to diversify and grow its economy, in 2008 the 
Sarawak state government embarked upon a massive industrialization drive that had at 
its center large-scale industry in an industrial corridor called SCORE.  This diversification 
drive is premised on the supply of renewable energy, primarily HEP, to huge energy-
guzzling industrial complexes in central Sarawak such as manganese, silicon, and alumi-
num smelters.  The idea is that access to cheap, green, renewable energy should allow 
the state to build up its industry and grow the economy, increase employment, scale up 
technology, enhance education tailored to industrial needs, and so forth.  Ipso facto, all 
this would soon lead to economic growth, social welfare improvements, and development 
for all.
The problem is that the number and size of all the proposed HEP dams are huge. 
Those built have already displaced thousands of indigenous peoples and their communi-
ties into new resettlements, which has left them significantly worse off than before.  And 
this after the forests of Sarawak were already decimated by logging and land clearing for 
the establishment of oil palm plantations.  Central to the plight of all these displaced 
indigenous peoples has been the attitude of the Sarawak government, which has con-
sistently refused to recognize the environment as a sustainable resource with a limited 
carrying capacity and has refused to be inclusive in its dealings with indigenous com-
munities despite all its rhetoric about adhering to international protocols and internation-
ally binding conventions that govern development interventions and interactions with 
indigenous peoples.
This patronizing and prejudiced outlook toward ordinary native landowners and the 
forest environment is largely explained by the nexus of close linkages that bind key 
politicians in the state administration with crony businesses via state patronage in the 
form of timber concessions, land grants, and infrastructure contracts that have proven to 
be environmentally destructive.  Sarawak’s over-reliance on resource-based extractive 
industries and capital-intensive industries has thus generated huge profits for their own-
ers and their political associates but has been destructive to the forest environment.
The model of NEP development in the state (of which state patronage is central) 
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over the years has brought about unequal development and path dependence.  As well, 
the state’s advocacy of “clean and green energy” in the form of 52 HEP mega-dams to 
power heavy industrialization in SCORE has complicated the development of policy 
options that prioritize environmental and economic sustainability.  Although rhetoric 
within the state administration has prized long-term economic growth, the reality is that 
state capture by key crony political-economic interests has more often than not seen 
them influence and subsequently derive exclusive benefit from the outcomes of develop-
ment plans and economic decisions taken by key politicians in the state.
The advocacy of HEP dam development to access a large source of “cheap and 
renewable” energy for heavy industries with their accompanying pollution has brought 
about further environmental problems.  The huge release of greenhouse gases from the 
numerous dams is already contributing toward ozone depletion, global warming, and 
climate change.  Further dam development can only make things worse.
One is thus constrained to surmise that Sarawak’s unilinear and path-dependent 
approach toward development that prioritizes large-scale infrastructure-led industrializa-
tion projects is environmentally unsustainable and economically unjust since it is largely 
self-serving for the political-business elites of the state.  Although this approach is viewed 
as a panacea in the state’s drive for growth and development, it is a chimera since it 
eschews any serious responsibilities toward husbanding natural resources or caring for 
the environment (local and global), and it has a deep-rooted callous disregard for the 
interests and livelihoods of the state’s indigenous peoples.  It is a recipe for an unfolding 
disaster.
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Postscript
In late July 2015, owing to intense pressure from widespread grassroots opposition against the building 
of the Baram dam led by Save Rivers (a local nongovernmental organization), Chief Minister Adenan 
Satem announced a moratorium on the building of the Baram Dam.  In early 2016, as the 11th state 
elections approached and having an eye on winning as many seats as possible, the chief minister once 
again reiterated his commitment to the moratorium.  Although there was initial skepticism over this 
moratorium (since the Bakun dam had been shelved twice—in 1990 and 1997—before finally being built), 
the cancellation of the Baram dam was confirmed when the state government published a notice in the 
Sarawak Government Gazette on February 18, 2016 that officially revoked and repealed its gazette of 
September 5, 2013 acquiring all native lands earmarked for the dam project (Save Rivers, March 21, 
2016).
A. Aeria404
References
Abdul Aziz Husain.  2007.  Chinese Power Plants in Malaysia: Present & Future Development.  Paper 
presented at the “China—ASEAN Power Corporation and Development Forum,” Nanning, Guangxi, 
China, October 28–29.
Abdul Majid Mat Salleh; Hatta Solhee; and Mohd. Yusof Kasim, eds.  1990.  Socio-economic Development 
in Sarawak: Policies and Strategies for the 1990s.  Kuching: Angkatan Zaman Mansang.
Aeria, Andrew.  2013.  Skewed Economic Development and Inequality: The New Economic Policy in 
Sarawak.  In The New Economic Policy in Malaysia: Affirmative Action, Ethnic Inequalities and Social 
Justice, edited by Edmund Terence Gomez and Johan Savaranamuttu, pp. 117–147.  Petaling Jaya 
and Singapore: SIRD and NUS Press.
―.  2002.  Politics, Business, the State and Development in Sarawak, 1970–2000.  PhD disserta-
tion, University of London.
Allison, Tony.  2000.  Malaysia’s Bakun Project: Build and Be Damned.  Asia Times.  October 28.  http://
www.atimes.com/reports/BJ28Ai01.html, accessed September 18, 2014.
Asian Development Bank (ADB).  1999.  Special Evaluation Study on the Social and Environmental 
Impacts of Selected Hydropower Projects.  http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/evaluation-document/ 
35473/files/ss-36.pdf, accessed November 1, 2012.
ASNB.  2015.  Prospectus & Product Highlights Page.  http://www.asnb.com.my/v3_/asnbv2_2funds_
EN.php#asn, accessed September 9, 2014.
Avang Itik.  1999.  Report on Short Visit to Two Long Houses in Batang Ai.  November 19.  www.rengah.
c2o.org/pdf/batang.pdf, accessed November 7, 2012.
Bakun National Hydroelectric Project (BNHP).  2011.  Welcome to Bakun Hydroelectric Dam Malaysia. 
http://www.bakundam.com/home.html, accessed November 1, 2012.
Baru Bian.  2012.  The Hardships Faced by Sarawakian Workers.  Press Conference Statement.  March 
16.  Parti Keadilan Rakyat Sarawak.  http://www.barubian.net/2012/03/hardships-faced-by-sarawakian-
workers.html, accessed November 7, 2012.
Bevis, W. W.  1995.  Borneo Log: The Struggle for Sarawak’s Forests.  Seattle and London: University of 
Washington Press.
Bhagwati, J. N.  1982.  Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities.  Journal of Political Economy 
90: 988–1002.
Brown, David W.  2001.  Why Governments Fail to Capture Economic Rent: The Unofficial Appropriation 
of Rain Forest Rent by Rulers in Insular Southeast Asia between 1970 and 1999.  PhD dissertation, 
University of Washington.  http://www.reocities.com/davidbrown_id/TOC.htm, accessed November 
11, 2012.
Bruno Manser Fonds (BMF).  2014.  The Risks of Investing in SCORE and Sarawak Dams.  http://www.
stop-corruption-dams.org/resources/BMF_2014_risks_of_investing_in_Sarawak.pdf, accessed 
March 31, 2015.
―.  2013a.  Exclusive: Sarawak Dams to Flood 2,300 km2 of Rainforests, Displace Tens of Thou-
sands of Natives.  https://www.facebook.com/notes/bruno-manser-fonds/exclusive-sarawak-dams-
to-flood-2300-km2-of-rainforests-displace-tens-of-thousan/539676986071755, accessed September 
8, 2014.
―.  2013b.  Flood Areas of Sarawak Dam Projects.  http://www.stop-corruption-dams.org/
resources/Sarawak_12_Dams.pdf, accessed September 8, 2014.
―.  2013c.  Sarawak Energy Awarded US$226 Million in Contracts to Malaysian Chief Minister’s 
Family.  http://www.bmf.ch/en/news/sarawak-energy-awarded-us-226-million-in-contracts-to-
malaysian-chief-ministers-family, accessed September 8, 2014.
Economic Development via Dam Building 405
―.  2012a.  Sold Down the River: How Sarawak Dam Plans Compromise the Future of Malaysia’s 
Indigenous Peoples.  http://www.stop-corruption-dams.org/resources/Sold_down_the_river_BMF_
dams_report.pdf, accessed September 8, 2014.
―.  2012b.  Norwegian CEO’s Job on the Line after Sarawak Energy Loses Crucial Australian 
Support.  https://www.facebook.com/notes/save-rivers/norwegian-ceos-job-on-the-line-after-sarawak-
energy-loses-crucial-australian-sup/549020901793599, accessed September 8, 2014.
―.  2010.  Malaysia and China Sign US$11 Bn Power Deal That Involves the Displacement of 
608,000 Borneo Natives.  October 13.  http://brimas.www1.50megs.com/BMF_13Jan10.pdf, 
accessed September 8, 2014.
Bryan, J.; Shearman, P.; Asner, G. et al.  2013.  Extreme Differences in Forest Degradation in Borneo: 
Comparing Practices in Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei.  PLOS ONE (Public Library of Science) 8 (7): 
1–7.
Bugo, Hamid.  1984.  The Economic Development of Sarawak: The Effect of Export Instability.  Kuching: 
Summer Times.
Chemsian Konsultant Sdn Bhd.  2011.  MURUM Hydroelectric Power Project Resettlement Action Plan: 
Final Report.  November.  http://www.stop-corruption-dams.org/resources/Murum_RAP_November_ 
11.pdf, accessed December 14, 2012.
China Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research (CIWRHR).  2009.  Batang Ai Hydroelec-
tric Extension Project.  http://www.iwhr.com/english/newsview.asp?NewsID=21065, accessed 
November 1, 2012.
Cleary, Mark; and Eaton, Peter.  1995.  Borneo: Change and Development.  Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Coalition of Concerned NGOs on Bakun (Gabungan), Malaysia.  1999.  The Resettlement of Indigenous 
People Affected by the Bakun Hydro-Electric Project, Sarawak, Malaysia.  http://www. 
internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/resettlement_of_indigenous_people_at_bakun.pdf, 
accessed November 2, 2012.
Colchester, Marcus.  1989.  Pirates, Squatters and Poachers: The Political Ecology of Dispossession of the 
Native Peoples of Sarawak.  London: Survival International & Institute of Social Analysis.
Department of Statistics, Malaysia.  1995.  Population and Housing Census Malaysia 1991: General Report 
of the Population Census, Vol. 1.  Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics.
Department of Statistics, Sarawak.  Various years.  Yearbook of Statistics, Sarawak.  Kuching: Department 
of Statistics Malaysia, Sarawak.
EcoKnights.  2010.  The Dummies Guide to the Bakun Dam.  http://www.ecoknights.org.my/resources/
education-a-people/864-the-dummies-guide-to-the-bakun-dam.html, accessed November 2, 2012.
Evans, Peter B.  1995.  Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation.  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
First Peoples Worldwide.  2012.  Malaysian Indigenous Communities Demand Referendum on Mega-
Dams.  www.firstpeoples.org/wp/tag/batang-ai/, accessed November 14, 2012.
Gomez, Edmund T.  1999.  Chinese Business in Malaysia: Accumulation, Ascendance, Accommodation. 
Hawaii: University of Hawai‘i Press.
Gomez, Edmund T.; and Jomo K. S.  1997.  Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Government of Malaysia.  2010.  Tenth Malaysia Plan, 2011–2015.  Putrajaya: Economic Planning Unit, 
Prime Minister’s Department.
―.  2008.  Mid-term Review of the Ninth Malaysia Plan.  Putrajaya: Economic Planning Unit, Prime 
Minister’s Department.
―.  2006.  Ninth Malaysia Plan, 2006–2010.  Putrajaya: Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s 
A. Aeria406
Department.
―.  1996.  Seventh Malaysia Plan, 1996–2000.  Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department.
―.  1993.  Mid-term Review of the Sixth Malaysia Plan, 1991–1995.  Kuala Lumpur: National 
Printing Department.
―.  1991.  Sixth Malaysia Plan, 1991–1995.  Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department.
―.  1989.  Mid-term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986–1990.  Kuala Lumpur: National 
Printing Department.
―.  1986.  Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986–1990.  Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department.
―.  1984.  Mid-term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981–1985.  Kuala Lumpur: Government 
Printers.
―.  1981.  Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981–1985.  Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department.
―.  1976.  Third Malaysia Plan, 1976–1980.  Kuala Lumpur: Government Press.
―.  1973.  Mid-term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971–1975.  Kuala Lumpur: Government 
Press.
―.  1971.  Second Malaysia Plan, 1971–1975.  Kuala Lumpur: Government Press.
Hong, Evelyn.  1987.  Natives of Sarawak: Survival in Borneo’s Vanishing Forests.  Penang: Institut 
Masyarakat.
Hornbill Unleashed.  2011.  Bakun: Empty Promises, Damned Lives.  https://hornbillunleashed.wordpress.
com/2011/01/18/13687/, accessed November 14, 2012.
How, Janice; Verhoeven, Peter; and Effiezal Aswadi Abdul Wahab.  2013.  Institutional Investors, Polit-
ical Connections and Analysts Coverage in Malaysia.  http://www.apira2013.org/proceedings/pdfs/
K084.pdf, accessed March 14, 2015.
IDEAL.  1999.  Tanah Pengidup Kitai: Our Land Is Our Livelihood.  Sibu: IDEAL Time Sdn Bhd.
International Rivers.  2012.  Sarawak Energy Publishes “Facts” about the Murum Dam.  http://www.
stop-corruption-dams.org/resources/Commentary_on_SEB_Factsheet_on_Murum_Dam___
Oct_2012_.pdf, accessed September 9, 2014.
―.  n.d.  Bakun Dam.  http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/bakun-dam, accessed 
 September 9, 2014.
―.  n.d.  Murum Dam.  http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/murum-dam, accessed 
September 9, 2014.
International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO).  1990.  Report Submitted to the International Tropical 
Timber Council: “The Promotion of Sustainable Forest Management: A Case Study of Sarawak, Malay-
sia.”  Yokohama: ITTO.
Jackson, James C.  1968.  Sarawak: A Geographical Survey of a Developing State.  London: University of 
London Press.
Jarrow, Roselind.  2010.  Settlers Need Sustainable Economic Activities.  Free Malaysia Today News. 
July 13.  http://archive.freemalaysiatoday.com/fmt-english/politics/sabah-and-sarawak/7896-settlers-
need-sustainable-economic-activities, accessed November 1, 2012.
Jehom, Welyne Jeffrey.  2008.  Resettlement and Displacement: Kenyah-Badeng of Sg. Asap Resettle-
ment, Belaga, Sarawak, Malaysia.  PhD dissertation, University of Bonn.
Jomo K. S.; Chang, Y. T.; Khoo, K. J. et al.  2004.  Deforesting Malaysia: The Political Economy and Social 
Ecology of Agricultural Expansion and Commercial Logging.  London: Zed Books; Geneva: UNRISD.
Kaur, Amarjit.  1998a.  Economic Change in East Malaysia: Sabah and Sarawak since 1850.  Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press.
―.  1998b.  A History of Forestry in Sarawak.  Modern Asian Studies 32(1): 117–147.
Kedit, Vernon.  2012.  In Deepest Reaches of Sarawak, Abject POVERTY & POLLUTION Greet Baru 
Bian & PKR.  Hornbill Unleashed.  November 4.  http://hornbillunleashed.wordpress.com/2012/ 
Economic Development via Dam Building 407
11/04/37008/, accessed November 7, 2012.
Krueger, Anne O.  1974.  The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.  American Economic Review 
64: 291–303.
Lande, Carl H.  1964.  Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics.  Monograph 
No. 6.  New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.
Lee, Nyanti; Ling, Teck Yee; and Jongkar Grinang.  2012.  Physico-chemical Characteristics in the Fill-
ing Phase of Bakun Hydroelectric Reservoir, Sarawak, Malaysia.  International Journal of Applied 
Science and Technology 2(6): 92–101.  http://www.ijastnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_6_June_2012/15.
pdf, accessed November 14, 2012.
Leigh, Michael B.  1991.  Money Politics and Dayak Nationalism: The 1987 Sarawak State Election.  In 
Images of Malaysia, edited by Muhammad Ikmal Said and Johan Savaranamuttu, pp. 180–202.  Kuala 
Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia.
―.  1979.  Is There Development in Sarawak?  Political Goals and Practice.  In Issues in Malaysian 
Development, edited by James C. Jackson and Martin Rudner, pp. 339–374.  Singapore: Heinemann.
Liew, Chin Fah.  2007.  Sustainable Forest Management in Sarawak.  Sarawak Forestry Corporation 
Presentation to the European Union.  January 17.  http://www.sarawaktimber.org.my/timber_
issue/1205742000-SFM_to_EU.pdf, accessed November 1, 2013.
Lim, Hong Hai.  1997.  Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia: The Real Bargain or What Have They Gotten 
Themselves Into?  Kajian Malaysia 15 (1 and 2): 15–56.
Ling, Teck Yee; Paka, Debbie D.; Lee Nyanti; Norhadi Ismail; and Emang, Justin J. J.  2012.  Water Qual-
ity at Batang Ai Hydroelectric Reservoir (Sarawak, Malaysia) and Implications for Aquaculture. 
International Journal of Applied Science and Technology 2(6): 23–30.  http://www.ijastnet.com/journals/
Vol_2_No_6_June_2012/5.pdf, accessed November 14, 2012.
Majid-Cooke, Fadzilah.  1999.  The Challenge of Sustainable Forests: Forest Resource Policy in Malaysia, 
1970–1995.  Sydney: Allen & Unwin; Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.
―.  1997.  The Politics of “Sustainability” in Sarawak.  Journal of Contemporary Asia 27(2): 
217–241.
Malaysian Rating Corporation Berhad.  2015.  Economic Research: The State of Sarawak.  Kuala Lumpur: 
Malaysian Rating Corporation Berhad.
Mason, Richard.  1995.  Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak and the Sarawak State Elections of 1987 and 1991. 
Kajian Malaysia 13(1): 26–58.
Mersat, Neilson.  2005.  Politics and Business in Sarawak, 1963–2004.  PhD dissertation, Australian 
National University.
Milne, R. S.  1973.  Patrons, Clients and Ethnicity: The Case of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia.  Asian 
Survey 13(10): 891–908.
Milne, R. S.; and Mauzy, Diane K.  1999.  Malaysian Politics under Mahathir.  London and New York: 
Routledge.
Mongabay.  2009.  Power, Profit, and Pollution: Dams and the Uncertain Future of Sarawak.  http://news.
mongabay.com/2009/0903-moses_sarawak_dams.html, accessed November 2, 2012.
Netto, Anil.  1998.  Development Bulletin-Malaysia: Resettlement Continues in Bakun Dam Project. 
http://ipsnews2.wpengine.com/1998/12/development-bulletin-malaysia-resettlement-continues-in-
bakun-dam-project/, accessed November 2, 2012.
Ngidang, Dimbab.  1996.  Batang Ai Hydropower Resettlement Scheme.  In Resettlement and Development 
in Sarawak: Experiences and Future Trends, edited by Hatta Solhee et al., pp. 18–32.  Kuching: 
Angkatan Zaman Mansang Sarawak.
Ooi, Keat Gin, ed.  2004.  Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia from Angkor Wat to East Timor.  Santa 
Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc.
A. Aeria408
―.  1997.  Of Free Trade and Native Interests: The Brookes and the Economic Development of 
Sarawak, 1841–1941.  Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Peoplesdocumentary.  2012.  Pollution from Aluminium Smelting Plant at Balingian, Mukah.  http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=8wJJx2ng-Yo, accessed October 11, 2014.
Permodalan Nasional Berhad [National Equity Corporation] .  2013.  Laporan tahunan ASNB bagi tahun 
kewangan berakhir 31 Disember 2012 [Annual report of ASNB for the financial year ended December 
31, 2012].  Kuala Lumpur: PNB.
Phoa, John.  2003.  The Political Economy of Sarawak’s Timber Industry and Its Impact on the Indigenous 
Peoples.  PhD dissertation, University of Malaya.
Press Metal Berhad (PMB).  2013.  Power Outage Incident at Its Smelting Plant in Mukah, Sarawak. 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/market/listed-companies/company-announcements/1338685, 
accessed May 28, 2014.
―.  2010.  Sale and Purchase Agreement and Shareholders’ Agreement between Press Metal 
Berhad and Sumitomo Corporation in Respect of Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd.  http:// 
announcements.bursamalaysia.com/edms/edmswebh.nsf/all/482576120041BDAA482577AC003E20CA/ 
$File/PRESS%20METAL%20BERHAD.pdf, accessed November 9, 2012.
Reece, R. H. W.  1988.  Economic Development under the Brookes.  In Development in Sarawak, edited 
by R. A. Cramb and R. H. W. Reece, pp. 21–34.  Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Monash University.
Regional Corridor Development Authority (RECODA).  2015a.  What Is SCORE?  http://www.recoda.
com.my/invest-in-score/what-is-score/, accessed March 31, 2015.
―.  2015b.  What Is RECODA?  http://www.recoda.com.my/about-recoda/what-is-recoda/, 
accessed March 31, 2015.
―.  2015c.  SCORE Areas.  http://www.recoda.com.my/invest-in-score/score-areas/, accessed 
March 31, 2015.
―.  2015d.  Priority Sectors.  http://www.recoda.com.my/priority-sectors/, accessed March 31, 
2015.
―.  2013.  Investors.  http://www.recoda.com.my/invest-in-score/investors/, accessed December 
14, 2014.
―.  2012.  Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy.  www.sarawakscore.com.my/modules/recoda/, 
accessed December 14, 2014.
Ross, Michael L.  2001.  Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Sarawak Energy.  2014.  Sarawak Energy Signs with Sinohydro-Trenergy JV for 500 kV Backbone 
Transmission Works (Packages B & C).  http://www.sarawakenergy.com.my/index.php/news-
events-top/latest-news-events/latest-media-release/631-sarawak-energy-signs-with-sinohydro-
trenergy-jv-for-500kv-backbone-transmission-works-packages-b-c, accessed September 10, 2014.
―.  2013.  About Us. Syarikat Sesco Berhad.  http://www.sarawakenergy.com.my/index.php/
about-us/subsidiaries/syarikat-sesco-berhad, accessed September 10, 2014.
―.  2012.  Murum Dam Fast Facts.  http://www.stop-corruption-dams.org/resources/Murum_
QA_October.2012.pdf, accessed September 10, 2014.
Sarawak Government.  2014.  Press Statements Related to SCORE.  http://www.sarawak.gov.my/web/
home/search/?keyword=score&cat=, accessed September 10, 2014.
Sarawak Integrated Water Resources Management (SIWRM) Master Plan.  2008.  Hydroelectric Power 
Dams in Sarawak.  www.siwrs.com.my/modules/iwrm/page.php?id=8&menu_id=0&sub_id=3, 
accessed November 10, 2012.
Sarawak Ministry of Land Development (SMLD) and Sarawak Aluminium Company (SALCO).  2008. 
Economic Development via Dam Building 409
Joint Survey and Assessment: Opportunities and Constraints Governing the Ways SALCO Smelter 
Project Might Benefit the People of Sungai Asap.  SMLD & SALCO. Mimeo.
Sarawak Report.  2014.  Baram Dam Blockade.  http://www.sarawakreport.org/baram/issue, accessed 
September 22, 2014.
Sarok, Ahi.  2009.  Quality Management in Local Government Administration in Sarawak: Process, 
Implementation and Customers’ Perceptions.  PhD dissertation, University of Malaya.
SarVision.  2011.  Impact of Oil Palm Plantations on Peatland Conversion in Sarawak 2005–2010.  Sum-
mary Report.  January 25.  Wageningen: SarVision.  http://www.wetlands.org/Portals/0/publications/
Report/Malaysia%20Sarvision.pdf, accessed November 21, 2012.
Save Rivers.  2016.  Surprise Change of Event for Baram Dam.  Save Rivers press statement.  March 21.
―.  2013a.  NGO letter to IHA.  April.  http://borneoproject.org/wp-content/uploads/NGO-letter-
to-IHA_April-2013.pdf, accessed November 30, 2013.
―.  2013b.  300 Indigenous People Protest Dams outside the International Hydropower Asso-
ciation’s Congress at the Borneo Convention Center.  https://www.facebook.com/notes/save-
rivers/300-indigenous-people-protest-dams-outside-the-international-hydropower-associat/ 
629818107047211, accessed November 30, 2013.
Scott, James C.  1972.  Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia.  The American 
Political Science Review 66(1): 91–113.
Shireen Mardziah Hashim.  1998.  Income Inequality and Poverty in Malaysia.  Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield.
SMEC Malaysia.  2007–12.  Batang Ai Hydroelectric Scheme (Years 1977–87).  www.smecmal.com.my/
projects_detail.php?subaction=showfull&id=1196950865&archive=&st, accessed December 30, 
2013.
Soda, Ryoji.  2001.  Rural-Urban Migration of the Iban of Sarawak and Changes in Long-house Com-
munities.  Geographical Review of Japan 74(1): 92–112.
Sovacool, Benjamin K.; and Bulan, L. C.  2011.  Meeting Targets, Missing People: The Energy Security 
Implications of the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE).  Contemporary Southeast Asia 
33(1): 56–82.  http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/contemporary_
southeast_asia_a_journal_of_international_and_strategic_affairs/v033/33.1.sovacool.pdf, accessed 
November 17, 2012.
Straumann, Lukas.  2014.  Money Logging: On the Trail of the Asian Timber Mafia.  Basel: Bergli Books.
Sulaiman Kadikon.  2013.  The Bakun Hydro Electrical Project (HEP), Sarawak, Malaysia: The Mani-
festation of Islamic System between Environment and Development.  https://hydropowerinmalaysia. 
files.wordpress.com/2013/11/the-bakun-hydro-electrical-project-hep-sarawak.pdf, accessed 
 September 30, 2014.
Swain, Ashok; and Ang, Ming Chee.  2004.  Political Structure and “Dam” Conflicts: Comparing Cases 
in Southeast Asia.  Proceedings of the Workshop on Water and Politics Understanding the Role of 
Politics in Water Management, Marseille, February 26–27, 2004, pp. 95–113.  http://www. 
saintlazarefoundation.org/Docs/UN/WorldWaterCouncil-WaterAndPolitics.pdf, accessed November 
29, 2012.
Syawe, Seh Ling Iris.  1990.  Industrial and Entrepreneurs’ Profiles of Sarawak.  Paper presented at the 
seminar on “Small and Medium Industries in Sarawak,” jointly organized by the Ministry of Indus-
trial Development, Sarawak, and Mara Institute of Technology, Sarawak Branch, Kuching, June 
9–10.
Tawie, Joseph.  2010.  Bakun Compensation: Dispute Delaying Payments.  http://scanenews.blogspot.
com/2010/08/bakun-compensation-dispute-delaying.html, accessed December 1, 2012.
The Borneo Project.  n.d.  NGO Coalition Condemns Malaysian Dam Plans.  http://borneoproject.org/
A. Aeria410
updates/ngo-coalition-condemns-malaysian-dam-plans, accessed November 1, 2012.
―.  n.d.  Stop the Dams.  http://borneoproject.org/our-work/ongoing-campaigns/stop-the-dams, 
accessed November 1, 2012.
Tollison, Robert D.  1982.  Rent Seeking: A Survey.  Kyklos 35: 575–602.
Tullock, Gordon.  1967.  The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft.  Western Economic Journal 
5: 224–232.
UN ESCAP.  1998.  Local Government in Asia and the Pacific: A Comparative Study, Country Paper: 
Malaysia.  United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Publication 
and Resources.  http://www.un.org/, accessed December 1, 2012.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Malaysia.  2007.  Malaysia: Measuring and Monitoring 
Poverty and Inequality.  Kuala Lumpur: UNDP Malaysia.
United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA).  2012.  Climate Change: Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions.  http://epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/ch4.html, accessed December 1, 
2012.
Unit Perancang Ekonomi [Economic Planning Unit (EPU)].  2011.  Statistik sosio-ekonomi: Pendapatan 
& kemiskinan isi rumah [Socio-economic statistics: Household income & poverty].  Putrajaya: 
Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department.
Wain, Barry.  2009.  Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times.  Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Wee, Chong Hui.  1995.  Sabah and Sarawak in the Malaysian Economy.  Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed 
& Co.
World Bank.  1991.  Malaysia Forestry Subsector Study, Report No. 9775-MA, Draft.  Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
World Rainforest Movement (WRM) and Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM).  1989.  The Battle for Sarawak’s 
Rainforests.  Penang: World Rainforest Movement and Sahabat Alam Malaysia.
Yale Environment Review.  2013.  Ecological and Social Price of Mega-dam Power Projects Might Be 
Too High.  http://environment.yale.edu/yer/article/price-of-megadam-power-projects-might-be-too-
high, accessed September 2, 2014.
Yi, Ge Qiu.  2009.  Agi idup, agi ngelaban?  [Will the river burst the dam?].  http://aliran.com/963.html, 
accessed November 29, 2012.
Newspapers
Malaysia Ponders What to Do with a White Elephant.  Asia Sentinel.  April 24, 2012.
MTUC Calls for RCI on Influx of Foreign Workers.  The Borneo Post.  November 26, 2014.
MTUC Sarawak Wants More to Be Done to Help Local Workers.  The Borneo Post.  May 4, 2014.
Rights of Owners of NCR Land on Islands in Bakun Recognised.  The Borneo Post.  July 8, 2013.
Sarawak Energy Apologises to Sarawakians.  The Borneo Post.  June 28, 2013.
Dams Can Reverse Rural-Urban Drift.  The Borneo Post.  June 18, 2013.
Cost-Benefit Analysis Done before Building Dams: Awg Tengah.  The Borneo Post.  May 28, 2013.
Batang Ai: 30 Years On.  The Borneo Post.  May 19, 2013.  http://www.theborneopost.com/2013/05/19/
batang-ai-30-years-on/#ixzz3W2p465Cl, accessed September 8, 2014.
ASNB Remains Sarawakians’ Preferred Choice for Investment: Taib.  The Borneo Post.  February 20, 
2013.
Press Metal Denies Polluting Balingian River.  The Borneo Post.  July 16, 2012.
The Sungai Asap Experience.  The Borneo Post.  June 29, 2012.
Unresolved after 14 Years.  The Borneo Post.  June 17, 2012.
Press Metal Sarawak Proves Critics Wrong.  The Borneo Post.  May 8, 2012.
Economic Development via Dam Building 411
Blueprint for Lake Tourism within a Year.  The Borneo Post.  March 1, 2012.
Villagers Complain of Non-payment of Compensation.  The Borneo Post.  November 9, 2010.
Proposed Score Railway to Be Ready by 2015.  Edge Daily.  October 15, 2008.
Was Cost-Benefit Analysis Done on Dams?  Free Malaysia Today.  May 23, 2013.
RM6b Smelter Project in S’wak Scrapped.  Free Malaysia Today.  March 27, 2012.
‘Monument of Corruption’ Still Gets Flak.  Free Malaysia Today.  October 27, 2011.
Bakun Pushes Profitable Companies into the Red.  The Malay Mail.  December 1, 2004.
A-G Report: Mismanagement Cost Bakun Dam Operator Extra RM1.3b.  Malay Mail Online.  October 
2, 2013.
Stay in Bakun but Change Your Lifestyle, Natives Told.  Malaysiakini.  July 11, 2013.
In Another Blow, Bakun to Be Gazetted as National Park.  Malaysiakini.  July 6, 2013.
No Way Home for Bakun Natives.  Malaysiakini.  September 28, 2010.
Sorrowful Tale of Bakun Evictees.  Malaysiakini.  September 17, 2010.
Who Really ‘Scores’ in Sarawak’s Industrialisation Plans?  Malaysian Insider.  July 17, 2014.
SEB: Severe Energy Drop in Bakun Caused Power Failure.  New Straits Times.  June 28, 2013.
Grave Doubts about SCORE: Dr Mahathir Just Spoke Out Loud What Others Think.  Sarawak Report. 
January 30, 2015.
Mapping Taib’s Corruption.  Sarawak Report.  January 28, 2015.
DAP Slams Sarawak Energy’s CEO for Favouring Taib Companies.  Sarawak Report.  August 25, 2013.
Clean Energy?  Sarawak’s Dirty Dam Projects Set up a Stink!  Sarawak Report.  November 25, 2012.
GENOCIDE!  Murum’s Secret “Resettlement Action Plan Revealed—EXCLUSIVE EXPOSE.  Sarawak 
Report.  September 28, 2012.
How Corruption Filters Down: Dirty Deals at Sarawak Energy.  Sarawak Report.  April 10, 2012.
Bangladesh to Send 12,000 Workers to S’wak.  The Star.  October 21, 2014.
Sarawak Energy Awards RM619mil Job to Sinohydro JV.  The Star.  February 27, 2014.
A Potty Problem or Press Metal.  The Star.  July 3, 2013.
Sarawak on ASNB’s Top Three Spots.  The Star.  February 20, 2013.
Protests Won’t Stop Building of 12 Dams.  The Star.  April 12, 2009.  http://thestar.com.my/news/story.
asp?file=/2009/4/12/nation/3680959&sec=nation, accessed September 10, 2014.
Hydropower Important for S’wak: Taib.  The Star.  April 11, 2009.  http://thestar.com.my/news/story.
asp?file=/2009/4/11/nation/20090411165504&sec=nation, accessed September 10, 2014.
Sarawak to Build 12 Dams to Meet Future Power Needs.  The Star.  July 23, 2008.
A. Aeria412
Appendix: Flood Areas of Sarawak Dam Projects
Source: Bruno Manser Fonds (2013b).
Note: The Baram dam was cancelled in early 2016.  The Murum dam was completed in 2013 and its turbines 
commissioned by 2015.  Construction of the Baleh dam is now proceeding as of August 2016.
